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[441] 
The Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining 
American Exceptionalism in Corporate Law 
Jens Dammann 
American corporate law stands out when compared to other legal systems. At no time is 
this more apparent than with regard to the use of mandatory law. Corporate law in the 
United States is largely enabling, whereas most other countries around the globe rely 
heavily on mandatory corporate law. 
 
The traditional view seeks to explain this American exceptionalism by pointing to the 
phenomenon of regulatory competition. According to this view, regulatory competition 
has eroded mandatory corporate law norms in the United States, whereas the absence of 
such competition has allowed mandatory norms to persist in other countries. This 
narrative, however, confuses cause and effect. Regulatory competition exists where it is 
allowed to exist; the decisive question is why so many countries have chosen to protect 
their mandatory corporate law norms by suppressing regulatory competition while the 
United States has done the opposite. 
 
This Article argues that efficiency considerations are key to understanding this mandatory 
law puzzle. The efficiency of enabling versus mandatory corporate law is not uniform 
across countries; instead, it depends on numerous social and institutional factors, 
particularly the efficiency of stock markets, ownership patterns, judicial infrastructure, 
and labor market flexibility. As a result, enabling corporate law is substantially more 
efficient in the United States than it is in many European countries. In other words, the 
U.S. commitment to private ordering in corporate law might not be a simple political 
choice that other countries can copy at will, but rather the reflection of various deep-
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Introduction 
U.S. corporate law is largely of an enabling nature,1 meaning that 
relatively few provisions are mandatory. Moreover, those norms that are 
mandatory are sometimes trivial in the sense that they either do not 
affect important issues or that they correspond to what the parties would 
have agreed upon in any case.2 
Internationally, this U.S.-style libertarianism in corporate law is the 
exception rather than the rule.3 Most foreign corporate law systems rely 
strongly on mandatory corporate law. In France, for example, the law 
governing public corporations is notorious for leaving little room for 
private ordering,4 and German corporate law goes so far as to provide 
that all provisions in the German Stock Corporation Act are mandatory 
unless indicated otherwise.5 
One then faces an obvious puzzle: Why does the extent of mandatory 
corporate law differ so drastically among nations? The prevailing 
understanding points to regulatory competition as the answer.6 The 
argument is that regulatory competition has largely eroded mandatory 
corporate law in the United States,7 whereas the traditional lack of such 
 
 1. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. 
Rev. 833, 888 (2005) (pointing out that U.S. corporate law follows a clear and consistent “enabling” 
approach); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in 
Corporate Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 719, 742 (2006) (noting that U.S. corporate law is comprised mostly of 
default rules); John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 
and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 919, 939–40 (1988) (emphasizing that U.S. 
corporate law has become “largely enabling”); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the 
United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 865, 893 (1997) (noting the “prevalence of flexible enabling statutes in U.S. corporate 
law”); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 
102 Yale L.J. 2021, 2023 (1993) (noting the enabling approach of U.S. corporate law). 
 2. Cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 542, 544 (1990) (“[S]ome mandatory rules would be universally adopted anyway, assuming 
people thought about them.”). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. Yves Guyon, Zur Gestaltungsfreiheit im französischen Gesellschaftsrecht [On Private Ordering 
in French Corporate Law], in Gestaltungsfreiheit im Gesellschaftsrecht [Private Ordering in 
Corporate Law] 297, 297 (Marcus Lutter & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 1998) (noting that traditionally, 
the law governing public corporations in France has left almost no room for private ordering). 
 5. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, last amended 
by Gesetz [G], July 23, 2013, BGBl. I. at 3044, § 23(5) (Ger.) (providing that the certificate of 
incorporation can only deviate from the provisions of the Stock Corporation Act where that is 
explicitly allowed). 
 6. William Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Legal 
Stud. 303, 329 (1997) (pointing to charter competition as the reason behind America’s more enabling 
approach to corporate law).  
 7. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate 
Federalism, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 619, 626–31 (2006) (describing how toward the end of the 19th 
and the beginning of the twentieth century, states stripped their corporation codes of mandatory 
provisions in an effort to compete for corporate charters, stripped their corporation codes of 
mandatory provisions). 
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competition in Europe and most of the world has allowed jurisdictions 
outside of the United States to retain their mandatory corporate law norms.8 
Superficially, this traditional narrative, with its focus on regulatory 
competition, is quite appealing. Historically, it is clear that U.S. states 
have minimized the role of mandatory law in order to attract 
corporations.9 Moreover, it is equally clear that European jurisdictions—
and many other countries around the world—have long shunned 
regulatory competition in corporate law.10 Despite recent steps toward a 
European charter market, regulatory competition for publicly traded 
firms is essentially nonexistent in Europe.11 If this were not the case, then 
many of the mandatory norms found in European corporate law—such as 
worker codetermination—might be hard pressed to survive. In this sense, 
the argument that the absence or presence of regulatory competition is 
directly correlated to the survival or erosion of mandatory corporate law is 
quite persuasive. 
However, pointing to regulatory competition as the key factor 
explaining the disparity in prevalence of mandatory corporate law is 
unsatisfactory; it confuses cause and effect. The conflict of law norms that 
allowed for the emergence of regulatory competition in the United States, 
while preventing it in Europe and many countries outside of Europe, have 
never been written in stone. In the United States, Congress could have 
federalized the law governing public corporations by exercising the power 
afforded to it by the Commerce Clause12 but chose not to do so. In Europe, 
conversely, countries could have allowed regulatory competition to 
emerge but chose not to for the majority of the last century.13 
In each case, lawmakers’ attitudes toward mandatory corporate law 
played a crucial role in explaining the decision to allow or prohibit 
regulatory competition. In Europe, as in most other countries, the means 
for preventing regulatory competition was the so-called “real seat rule,” 
which subjects corporations to the law of the state wherein their “real 
seat” or headquarters is located.14 The “real seat rule” was introduced 
explicitly to prevent corporations from avoiding the mandatory corporate 
law regime of their home country by escaping to a jurisdiction with more 
 
 8. See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for 
Europe?, 12 Eur. L.J. 440, 450–51 (2006) (arguing that mandatory law rules such as those imposing 
codetermination have been able to survive because of the absence of regulatory competition). 
 9. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 7. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 600 (2003) (“[T]he federal 
government can displace state corporate law . . . rather easily.”). 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 132–33 (1993) 
(describing how the real seat doctrine prevented regulatory competition in Europe). 
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enabling corporate law.15 Similarly, lawmakers’ attitudes toward 
mandatory corporate law played a key role in the United States’ path 
toward enabling corporate law. If Congress had been hell-bent on 
preserving mandatory corporate law, it would have federalized the 
relevant norms—as it did with securities law. It follows, then, that 
regulatory competition or the absence thereof is but a means to an end. 
The underlying reasons why the United States has allowed mandatory 
law to erode while it still plays a crucial role in much of Europe must be 
found elsewhere. 
This Article argues that the answer to the mandatory law puzzle 
can, to a large extent, be found in efficiency considerations. Due to 
underlying social and institutional differences, enabling corporate law is 
simply more efficient and mandatory law less efficient in the United 
States than it is in Europe and much of the rest of the world. The larger 
point is that the benefits of enabling as opposed to mandatory corporate 
law are not identical all over the world; rather, they depend on the 
broader economic, social, legal, and institutional environment in each 
country. More specifically, this Article argues that the benefits of 
enabling norms are particularly pronounced in countries with dispersed 
stock ownership, well-developed securities markets, flexible labor 
markets, and highly specialized corporate law courts. On all of these, and 
various other pertinent measures, the United States does markedly well 
and is therefore uniquely positioned to reap the greatest possible benefits 
from adopting an enabling corporate law structure. By contrast, many 
foreign jurisdictions—including much of Europe—lag behind the United 
States on these relevant measures and therefore might not find enabling 
corporate law as rewarding—or mandatory corporate law as 
burdensome—as the United States. 
The result of this analysis is a new understanding of American 
exceptionalism in corporate law: America’s willingness to embrace private 
ordering is not simply the result of a political choice for regulatory 
competition that other countries can copy at will; rather, it is the 
expression of certain deep-seated structural features that distinguish the 
United States from other countries. 
One might conjecture that some of these features could be 
endogenous. Prevailing ownership patterns, for example, might not 
simply be the result, but also to some extent, the cause of existing 
corporate law norms.16 Accordingly, if the law were to change, ownership 
 
 15. France was the first country to introduce the real seat rule by statute, and it did so to stem the 
flight of French corporations to the more enabling corporate law jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. 
Bernhard Großfeld, Nationale und internationale Unternehmensverfassungen in Marktwirtschaftlichen 
Ordnungen [National and International Corporate Constitutions in Capitalist Systems], in Conflict and 
Integration: Comparative Law in the World Today 589, 595 (1989). 
 16. See infra Part V.B.  
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patterns might as well. However, even in the case of ownership patterns, 
the case for endogeneity is relatively weak. While strong protections for 
minority shareholders may increase the attractiveness of minority 
investments and thereby set the ground for dispersed ownership,17 it is 
not obvious why mandatory corporate law, which protects minority 
shareholders and constrains controlling shareholders, should lead to the 
emergence of controlling shareholders, or, vice versa, why enabling 
corporate law should result in dispersed ownership.18 Moreover, various 
other features of European legal systems, such as the prevalence of 
collective bargaining or the for-cause termination requirement in 
employment law, are even more unlikely to be the result—rather than 
the cause—of Europe’s predilection for mandatory corporate law.19 
Crucially, this Article does not argue that enabling law is generally 
efficient in the United States or generally inefficient elsewhere. Instead, 
the point is relative—regardless of how one views the efficiency of 
enabling corporate law in the United States, this Article argues that 
enabling corporate law norms are relatively more efficient in the United 
States than in most other countries. 
Obviously, efficiency considerations are not the only factors that play 
a role in explaining differences between U.S. and European corporate law. 
In many cases, it is possible to also name other factors that have 
contributed to the rise of a particular mandatory norm in Europe. A case 
in point is Germany’s mandatory codetermination regime that requires 
corporate boards to include a certain number of employee representatives. 
The emergence of this regime is owed at least in part to the peculiar 
political situation of postwar Germany when firms in the coal and steel 
industries saw codetermination as a way to escape decartelization.20 
However, this type of case-specific political account fails to explain why 
European corporate law exhibits greater reliance on mandatory law 
across the board. In any case, an efficiency-based account does not 
contradict political narratives of this type; rather, both explanations can 
complement each other. In other words, as is so often the case, efficiency 
considerations are not the whole story, but they are a particularly 
important part of the story. 
It should also be noted that the contrast between flexible corporate 
law in the United States and mandatory corporate law in Europe holds 
only for public corporations; even in Europe, the law provides much 
 
 17. See infra note 248.  
 18. See infra note 248 
 19. See infra notes 248, 196. 
 20. Jens C. Dammann, Note, The Future of Codetermination After Centros: Will German 
Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 607, 676 (2003). 
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more flexible norms where privately held firms are concerned.21 This is 
due in part to the fact that the vast majority of privately held firms are 
rather small and unsophisticated, and that smaller, less sophisticated 
firms tend to have more trouble complying with extensive mandatory 
regimes than larger firms. However, the differing treatment of privately 
held firms and publicly traded firms also provides further evidence for 
this Article’s thesis. Various factors that make mandatory corporate law 
more attractive in Europe than it is in the United States, such as 
differences in ownership structures or in the efficiency of security markets, 
are only relevant to public corporations and do not apply to privately held 
firms. Therefore, we should expect the European law on privately held 
firms to be more flexible than the law on publicly traded firms, and that 
is precisely what we observe. 
The analysis presented in this Article has far reaching implications 
for a number of important debates in corporate law. Chief among them is 
the debate over American exceptionalism. Scholars have long debated 
the extent to which American corporate law differs from other corporate 
law systems, and over what makes U.S. law unique. Traditionally, the 
focus has been on regulatory competition.22 This is no doubt justified. 
However, this Article argues that there may, in fact, be a “story behind 
the story.” Specifically, this Article argues that regulatory competition 
may have been able to thrive in the United States due to certain social 
and institutional factors that make enabling corporate law attractive and 
regulatory competition politically acceptable. 
By extension, this Article also has profound implications for the so-
called “convergence debate.” Scholars have debated for more than a 
decade about whether or not corporate law systems across the world are 
in the process of becoming more alike.23 With respect to the 
mandatory/enabling divide—an area in which the convergence question 
has not yet been raised—this Article argues that the answer lies 
somewhere in the middle. Given that the prevalence of enabling 
corporate law depends on the social and institutional environment, one 
 
 21. Many European countries have separate corporation statutes for closely held corporations. 
These statutes tend to rely much more strongly on enabling norms than the stock corporation statutes 
that are designed for public corporations. Cf. Sandra K. Miller, Minority Shareholder Oppression in the 
Private Company in the European Community: A Comparative Analysis of the German, United 
Kingdom, and French “Close Corporation Problem”, 30 Cornell Int’l. L.J. 381, 394 (1997) (noting 
that in contrast to the German Stock Corporation Act, the German law on closely held corporations, 
the GmbHG, provides for a comparatively flexible management structure). 
 22. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 14, at 4–5 (arguing that “[t]he genius of American corporate law 
is its federalist organization” which in turn allows for regulatory competition among states). 
 23. Contributions to this debate include Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1999); Ronald J. Gilson, 
Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329, 334–37 
(2001); Henry Hansmann, How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. Corp. L. 745 (2006); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo L.J. 439 (2001). 
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cannot expect full-scale convergence unless the underlying social and 
institutional conditions converge as well; in that respect, as discussed 
below, the landscape is mixed.24 
On a related note, this Article suggests that America’s commitment to 
a system of enabling corporate law might be more contingent than 
previously thought. Already, and much to the chagrin of many 
commentators,25 Congress has intervened to insert several mandatory 
federal stents into the heart of the enabling system of U.S. corporate law—
most notably with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010. This analysis suggests that more legislation might be to come 
unless the legal and institutional factors that render enabling law attractive 
are maintained. With respect to some factors—such as highly dispersed 
share ownership—this is not a given.26 Should these factors fade, the 
United States might see a broader shift toward mandatory corporate law. 
Part I of this Article demonstrates that mandatory corporate law is 
much more common in foreign countries than it is in the United States. 
Moreover, it shows that existing differences in the prevalence of 
mandatory corporate law are by no means economically or otherwise 
trivial. Part II summarizes the traditional arguments that have been used 
to justify the existence of mandatory corporate law. Part III then 
demonstrates that these same arguments have much more weight in 
foreign nations than in the United States. In other words, mandatory 
norms are in fact more defensible abroad than in the United States. 
Part IV discusses the implications of this analysis, and Part V focuses on 
possible future development, and concludes. 
I.  Diverging Roles for Mandatory Corporate Law 
United States corporate law consists largely of default rules.27 By 
international standards, however, this approach is unusual. Jurisdictions 
outside the United States rely much more heavily on mandatory 
corporate law. Particularly instructive is a study undertaken by Katharina 
Pistor and various co-authors that focuses on legal innovation in different 
 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1597–99 (2005) (arguing that the matters governed by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act are better left to the states); J. Mark Ramseyer, Stacking the Friday Workshop: An 
Introduction, 9 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 5 (2007) (suggesting that Sarbanes-Oxley includes “badly 
inefficient mandatory rules”). But see Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed 
Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 721, 756 (2005) 
(defending the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the ground that “selective federal regulation of corporate 
governance may offer a fruitful avenue of vertical competition, to supplement the horizontal 
competition at the heart of the present-day corporate law regime”). 
 26. See infra Part V.B. 
 27. See supra note 2. 
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corporate law systems.28 The study uses a jurisdiction’s reliance on 
enabling rather than mandatory law as one indicator of potential for 
innovation.29 It focuses on ten jurisdictions including Chile, Colombia, 
France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States—the latter represented by Delaware law. Not 
surprisingly, when it comes to the prevalence of enabling norms, 
Delaware “wins” hands down; corporate law in all other jurisdictions is 
substantially more mandatory. In the words of the authors, Delaware is 
an outlier “on the flexible end of the spectrum.”30 
The findings on this issue in the Pistor study are consistent with a 
wealth of individual cross-country comparisons. It has been noted again 
and again that other countries, particularly those in continental Europe, 
rely much more strongly on mandatory corporate law than does the 
United States.31 
Of course, the fact that foreign jurisdictions tend to make heavier 
use of mandatory corporate law does not per se imply that this difference 
matters. With respect to U.S. corporate law, Bernard Black has famously 
argued that mandatory corporate law is often trivial in the sense that it 
relates to unimportant issues, corresponds to what the parties would 
have agreed upon anyhow, or can be avoided by reincorporating in 
another jurisdiction.32 
Assuming for the sake of the argument that this is a fair 
characterization of mandatory corporate law in the United States, can 
the same be said for mandatory corporate law in other jurisdictions? Can 
one argue that differences in the prevalence of mandatory corporate law 
are technical differences without much economic importance? For some 
mandatory norms found in foreign jurisdictions, the answer is yes. For 
example, this Article later argues that the mandatory legal capital 
requirements—still a mainstay of continental European corporate law—
simply do not have much bearing on public corporations, and therefore 
 
 28. See generally Katharina Pistor et al., Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. Comp. Econ. 676 
(2003). 
 29. Id. at 689–91. 
 30. Id. at 689. 
 31. Cf. Eddy Wymeersch, Gestaltungsfreiheit und Gesellschaftsrecht in Belgien [Private Ordering 
and Corporate Law in Belgium], in Gestaltungsfreiheit im Gesellschaftsrecht [Private Ordering 
in Corporate Law], supra note 4, at 186 (noting that Belgian corporate law is increasingly permeated 
by mandatory norms); Levinus Timmerman, Gestaltungsfreiheit im niederländischen Gesellschaftsrecht 
[Private Ordering in Dutch Corporate Law], in Gestaltungsfreiheit im Gesellschaftsrecht [Private 
Ordering in Corporate Law], supra note 4, at 215 (noting that while the Netherlands used to enjoy a 
reputation as the European Delaware, this is no longer true, and that Dutch corporate law now 
contains numerous mandatory norms, particularly in the interest of corporate creditors). Regarding 
Germany and France, see supra text accompanying notes 4–5. 
 32. Black, supra note 2, at 544. 
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fail to represent a meaningful difference between U.S. and European 
corporate law.33 
There are also myriad mandatory corporate law norms that are 
clearly non-trivial—they are economically important, they fail to reflect 
the hypothetical bargain, and they cannot easily be avoided via 
reincorporation. The following Subpart begins by focusing on the first 
two of these criteria—economic importance and failure to reflect the 
hypothetical bargain—before demonstrating that reincorporation is not 
yet a viable option for public corporations in Europe. 
A. Important Mandatory Norms 
In Europe, it is not difficult to find mandatory corporate law norms 
that are economically significant and deviate from what the parties would 
have agreed upon if left to their own devices. Three examples might 
serve to illustrate this point: the rules on hostile takeovers, the 
mandatory bid rule in corporate acquisitions, and the rules governing 
employee codetermination. 
1. Hostile Takeovers 
Perhaps the most striking example of clearly non-trivial mandatory 
rules found in foreign jurisdictions is the law governing takeovers. 
On this side of the Atlantic, Delaware is relatively generous to 
incumbent managers when it comes to defensive measures against hostile 
takeovers. Under the famous Unocal standard, antitakeover defenses are 
protected by the business judgment rule, as long as the directors 
reasonably viewed the takeover attempt as a danger to corporate policy 
and effectiveness, and the defensive measures were reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.34 Many commentators have argued that this 
allows managers to “just say no” to hostile takeovers.35 This 
characterization might be somewhat exaggerated, and it has certainly 
been rejected by the Delaware Chancery Court.36 However, there is a 
broad consensus that the board of a target corporation has wide latitude 
in defending against hostile takeover attempts.37 
 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). 
 35. E.g., Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 
152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577, 606 n.69 (2003); A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: 
The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 83, 106 (2004) (noting that the Unocal 
proportionality review leaves managers “essentially unconstrained”). 
 36. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 54 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“A board cannot 
‘just say no’ to a tender offer.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 950 (2002) [hereinafter Staggered Boards] (noting 
“the current trend in Delaware case law that is solidifying and expanding the ‘Just Say No’ defense”). 
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By contrast, European countries tend to be much less deferential to 
target boards. The United Kingdom has long imposed a mandatory rule 
prohibiting target board managers from taking any defensive measures 
against hostile takeovers.38 More recently, the European Union has 
followed in the United Kingdom’s footsteps and imposed this so-called 
neutrality principle as a matter of E.U. law.39 Although the relevant E.U. 
directive authorizes Member States to opt out of the prohibition against 
defensive measures,40 nineteen out of the twenty-eight E.U. Member 
States—a substantial majority and one that includes most of the large 
Member States—have chosen not to opt out.41 
Clearly, the neutrality principle is not trivial. This is true, first, in the 
sense that it has enormous economic significance. A wealth of evidence 
suggests that the availability of takeover defenses plays a crucial role in 
determining how many takeover attempts will occur and the extent to 
which they are successful. In the United States, the rise of the poison pill 
accompanied a sharp decline in the number of attempted hostile 
takeovers.42 Moreover, those hostile takeover attempts that do occur are 
often thwarted by the target’s defenses.43 In the United Kingdom, where 
the neutrality principle bars hostile takeover defenses, takeovers are 
more likely to be hostile, and hostile takeover attempts have a higher 
likelihood of success than in the United States.44 Thus, there is little 
question that the neutrality principle increases the likelihood and success 
rate of hostile takeovers. 
Furthermore, hostile takeovers are of great economic significance. 
The empirical evidence suggests that successful hostile takeovers 
increase shareholder wealth. Although it is not clear that the effects on 
 
Cf. Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 821 
(2002) (citing to study that claims no corporation has redeemed a poison pill since 1989). 
 38. The Takeover Code, 2013, § F, r. 21.1 (U.K.). While the Takeover Code followed later, the 
neutrality principle was introduced as early as 1959. John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile 
Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 Harv. Int’l L.J. 
219, 23637 (2011). 
 39. Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Apr. 2004 on 
Takeover Bids, art. 2, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 [hereinafter E.U. Takeover Directive]. 
 40. Id. art. 12. 
 41. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Application of Directive 
2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids, COM (2012) 347 final (June 28, 2012). 
 42. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the 
United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 2001, at 121, 126–27. 
 43. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 950 (presenting evidence that the presence of a charter 
provision classifying the board “substantially increase the likelihood that a target receiving a hostile 
bid will remain independent”). 
 44. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? 
—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 Geo. L.J. 1727, 1738–39 (2007). 
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the shareholders of the acquiring corporations are positive on balance,45 
the shareholders of the target corporation benefit substantially.46 
Crucially, these gains realized by the shareholders of target corporations 
are large enough to offset any losses to the shareholders of acquiring 
firms.47 In addition to these concrete financial benefits that are realized 
from a successful takeover, the mere threat of hostile takeover tends to 
discipline managers48 and is thus likely to increase shareholder wealth. 
Accordingly, studies that focus on abnormal returns to shareholders in 
case of takeovers are bound to understate the economic benefits of 
takeovers. 
Additionally, one cannot argue that the neutrality principle is trivial 
in the sense that corporations would choose to adopt it voluntarily. 
Corporate practice in Delaware demonstrates the opposite, in fact. 
Corporations are free to adopt the neutrality principle but consistently 
fail to do so.49 Instead, many of them do their best to prevent hostile 
takeovers: most initial public offering (“IPO”) firms now have poison 
pills and staggered board provisions that are designed to make takeovers 
more difficult.50 In sum, the mandatory neutrality principle clearly 
matters. 
 
 45. See, e.g., Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, J. Econ. Persp., 
Spring 2001, at 103, 110 (summarizing several studies between 1973 and 1998 and finding abnormal 
negative returns of 3.8%); Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, Shareholder Wealth Effects of European 
Domestic and Cross-Border Takeover Bids, 10 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 9, 23 tbl.6 (2004) (focusing on 
takeovers in the U.K. between 1993 and 2000 and finding negative abnormal returns of 1.65%). But 
see Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, The Returns to Acquiring Firms in Tender Offers: Evidence 
from Three Decades, Fin. Mgmt., Autumn 1989, at 16 (focusing on the time between 1963 and 1986 
and finding positive abnormal returns of 1.96%); Michael C. Jensen & Richard Ruback, The Market 
for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 16 (1983) (focusing on the time 
between 1958 and 1981 and finding positive abnormal returns in the amount of 3.8%). 
 46. Andrade et al., supra note 45, at 110 (reporting abnormal returns of 23.3%); Jarrell & 
Poulson, supra note 45, at 16 (finding abnormal returns of 28.9%); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 45, at 
10 tbl.3 (finding abnormal returns of 29.1%). 
 47. Andrade et al., supra note 45, at 103. 
 48. See Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect 
of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 J. Fin. 519, 526–43 (1999) (providing indirect evidence 
that the takeover threat disciplines managers by showing that managers protected by second-
generation antitakeover statutes tended to reduce their use of debt). 
 49. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive 
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871, 895 (2002) (“One does not . . . find IPO charters that 
limit the use of poison pills or incorporate the City Code’s ‘no frustrating actions’ standard.”). 
 50. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 889 (“In a large sample of major U.S. public companies, 
59% had a staggered board in 1998. Among firms going public in the 1990s, the incidence of staggered 
boards increased from 34% in 1990 to over 70% in 2001.”); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do 
IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protections in IPOs, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83, 87–88 
(2001) (stating that many IPO firms have both poison pills and staggered boards). It should be noted, 
though, that at least for the largest firms, the recent trend has been to move away from takeover 
defenses. For Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) 100 firms, “the incidence of staggered boards has declined 
from 44% to 16% between 2003 and 2009.” Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex. 
L. Rev. 987, 1009 (2010). 
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2. The Mandatory Bid Rule 
The so-called mandatory bid rule provides a further example of a 
mandatory law that cannot be categorized as trivial. Under U.S. law, an 
acquirer seeking to purchase control of a target corporation can limit 
himself to acquiring the minimum number of shares sufficient to convey 
control. For example, she might choose to buy just over fifty percent of 
the shares or an even lower number sufficient to exercise de facto 
control. Although the Williams Act, which governs tender offers, 
requires the acquirer to buy the relevant shares pro rata from all target 
shareholders willing to sell,51 she can still limit the overall number of 
shares she wants to purchase. Moreover, in the absence of a tender offer, 
the acquirer can also decide from whom she wants to buy the shares. For 
example, she might wish to purchase the shares from the incumbent 
controller in a private transaction. 
By contrast, European Union law imposes a so-called mandatory 
bid rule. This means that anyone acquiring a controlling stake in a public 
corporation has to offer to buy the remaining shares for the same price.52 
In other words, anyone seeking to buy a controlling stake faces the risk 
of having to purchase all of the target firm’s outstanding shares. 
This mandatory bid rule—so named because the acquirer has to 
make a bid for all of the target firm’s shares—has two main 
consequences. First, it necessitates that the acquirer have much more 
liquidity available than would be necessary under U.S. law. This effect 
has substantial economic importance because it means that the 
mandatory bid rule places an additional financial burden on the acquirer 
and thereby makes takeovers more expensive.53 
Second, because the mandatory bid rule applies to private 
transactions as well as to tender offers, it effectively allows the minority 
shareholders to share in any control premium paid to the controlling 
shareholder: if the incumbent controller demands a control premium 
when selling his shares, the minority shareholders can partake in the 
premium because they can demand to sell at the same price. Forcing the 
controlling shareholder to share the premium with the minority has well-
known consequences. On the one hand, such a rule deters inefficient 
takeovers in which the acquirer’s motivation for the takeover is the 
 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (2012). 
 52. E.U. Takeover Directive, supra note 39, art. 5(1). 
 53. Cf. Armour & Skeel, supra note 44, at 1737–38 (“By restricting the permitted range of partial 
bids, the mandatory bid rule chills some potential offers by forcing bidders to raise enough money to 
acquire the entire company, rather than just a controlling stake.”)(footnote omitted); Sapnoti K. 
Eswar, Has Takeover Regulation Altered Value Creation in the European M&A Market 23 (Feb. 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://northernfinance.org/2012/program/papers/411.pdf 
(finding that the mandatory bid rule makes at least some types of transactions more expensive). 
J - Dammann_17(Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:34 PM 
454 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:441 
intent to exploit the other shareholders.54 On the other hand, the buyout 
rule deters some efficient takeovers.55 
In sum, there is no doubt that the mandatory bid rule is economically 
important. The only question left is whether the mandatory bid rule is 
trivial in the sense that corporations would adopt it voluntarily. Again, 
however, the answer is no. A charter provision imposing a mandatory bid 
rule is unheard of.56 
3. Codetermination 
Codetermination is the third example of a mandatory rule that is 
clearly nontrivial. Codetermination regimes, adopted by many European 
countries, give employees a voice in how their company is run.57 The 
details vary depending on jurisdiction and company size and industry.58 
Germany has the most famous and far-reaching regime. By law, 
German corporations have a two-tier board structure comprising the 
managing board59 and the supervisory board.60 As the names imply, the 
managing board is charged with managing the company, whereas the 
supervisory board appoints the members of the managing board and 
supervises the managing board’s work.61 This two-tier board structure is 
crucial to the function of the German codetermination regime. Under the 
Codetermination Act,62 which applies to most corporations with two 
thousand or more employees,63 the shareholders elect only half of the 
supervisory board members while the employees elect the others.64 
 
 54. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. Econ. 
957, 971 (1994) (noting that with an equal opportunity rule, “if a transaction takes place, the minority 
shareholders will always be made better off by it”); Marcel Kahan, Sales of Corporate Control, 9 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 368, 369 (1993). 
 55. See Bebchuk, supra note 54, at 972 (noting that the equal opportunity rule “impedes efficient 
transfers”); Kahan, supra note 54, at 369 (noting that a rule that treats all shareholders equally 
“prevents all undesirable sales, but deters some desirable control sales”). 
 56. Cf. Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 
1325, 1329 (2013) (“The only significant governance provisions that appear in IPO charters are 
staggered boards.”). 
 57. For a survey of various European codetermination law regimes, see Mads Andenas & Frank 
Wooldridge, European Comparative Company Law 417–47 (2009). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, last amended 
by Gesetz [G], July 23, 2013, BGBl. I. at 3044, § 76(1) (Ger.) (entrusting the managing board with 
managing the corporation). 
 60. Id. § 84(1)(1) (charging the supervisory board with appointing the members of the managing 
board). 
 61. See supra notes 57–58; Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability 
Across Countries, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1385, 1421 (2006) (pointing out that the supervisory board appoints 
and monitors the managing board). 
 62. Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer, May 4, 1976, BGBl. I at 1153 (Ger.) 
[hereinafter Codetermination Act]. 
 63. Id. § 1(1)(2). A somewhat different regime applies to companies in the coal and steel industries. 
Such companies are exempt from the Codetermination Act, id. § 1(2), because and to the extent that they 
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There is no question that codetermination is economically important; 
however, the economic impact of codetermination is notoriously difficult 
to quantify. Non-German corporations of equal size that are not subject to 
the same regime operate in a different environment than their German 
counterparts, making it difficult to attribute differences in performance to 
the presence or absence of codetermination.65 Nonetheless, the indirect 
changes that codetermination brings alone are sufficient to categorize 
codetermination law as important. For example, there is a wealth of 
research showing that board size matters—all else equal, smaller boards 
are more effective than larger ones.66 Yet, in order to make room for 
employee representatives and to ensure the representation of different 
types of employees on corporate boards, codetermination law forces 
corporations to have rather large boards. For instance, the Codetermination 
Act requires corporations with more than twenty thousand employees to 
have a supervisory board with twenty members.67 
Moreover, as noted above, rules that allow corporations to take 
defensive measures against hostile takeovers matter a great deal; under 
German law, codetermination substantially facilitates such defensive 
measures because German law requires supervisory board approval of 
defensive measures68 and the employees’ board members can generally 
be expected to vote in favor of such measures given that workers tend to 
 
are subject to an older codetermination statute developed specifically for the coal, iron, and steel 
industries: the so-called Coal, Iron, and Steel Codetermination Act. See Gesetz zur Ergänzung des 
Gesetzes über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsräten und Vorständen der 
Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie [Supplementary Act to the 
Law Pertaining to the Participation of Workers in the Supervisory Boards and Managing Boards of 
Companies in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industries], Aug. 7, 1956, BGBl. I at 707 (Ger.). 
 64. Codetermination Act, May 4, 1976, BGB1. I at 1153, § 7(1). 
 65. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. 
Corp. L. 657, 678 (1996) (noting the absence of evidence that codetermination improves worker 
attitudes or motivation); Felix R. FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination, 95 
Scandinavian J. Econ. 365, 366 (1993) (finding “no significant effects of codetermination on 
productivity”). 
 66. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The 
Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q.J. Econ. 901, 929 (2001) (noting that in firms with concentrated 
ownership, smaller boards are “better able to charge their CEOs”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Larger 
Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms, 48 J. Fin. Econ. 35, 53 (1998) (presenting 
“evidence that a negative correlation between board size and profitability extends to small firms with 
small boards in Finland”); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure 
of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. Fin. 831, 865 (1993) (“Keeping boards small can help improve their 
performance. When boards go beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively 
and are easier for the CEO to control.”); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with 
a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. Fin. Econ. 185, 209 (1996) (finding “an inverse association between 
board size and firm value”). But see Mohamed Belkhir, Board of Directors’ Size and Performance in 
the Banking Industry, 5 Int. J. Managerial Fin. 201, 217 (2009) (analyzing firms in the banking sector 
and finding “robust evidence that larger boards achieve a higher performance”). 
 67. Codetermination Act, May 4, 1976, BGB1. I at 1153, § 7(1). 
 68. Wertpapiererwerbs- und übernahmegesetz [WpÜG] [Securities, Acquisitions, and Takeover 
Act], Dec. 20, 2001, BGBl. I at 2479 (F.R.G.) § 33(1) (Ger.). 
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oppose hostile takeovers out of concerns that the acquirer will seek to 
reduce the workforce.69 In sum, there is no question that codetermination 
has substantial economic significance. 
Further, codetermination certainly is not trivial in the sense that it 
would be adopted voluntarily. Quite to the contrary, one of the traditional 
arguments against the efficiency of codetermination has been that firms do 
not choose to adopt codetermination regimes on their own.70 
B. Mandatory Law and Regulatory Competition 
The question remains whether mandatory laws in foreign countries 
are trivial in a different way; namely, that they can easily be avoided via 
reincorporation. Europe has recently taken important steps toward 
regulatory competition in corporate law, raising the question of whether 
corporations can now escape mandatory law by reincorporating 
elsewhere. However, some mandatory laws—such as those governing 
mandatory bids—are imposed by E.U. law and therefore cannot be 
avoided by reincorporating in another Member State. Moreover, even to 
the extent that certain mandatory rules can be found at the Member 
State level, firms do not currently seem to view reincorporation in 
another Member State as a viable option for public corporations. Despite 
the potential for regulatory competition that Europe arguably has, its 
incipient charter market has so far failed to usher in an age of regulatory 
arbitrage for public corporations. 
For much of the twentieth century, prevailing choice of law rules 
made it prohibitively difficult and expensive for most European 
corporations to escape mandatory corporate law rules via reincorporation. 
More specifically, a majority of European countries used the so-called 
“real seat rule” to impose their own corporate law.71 According to this 
rule, the law that applies to a corporation’s internal affairs was 
determined by the corporate headquarters’ location or “real seat.”72 The 
only way for a corporation to escape its home state’s corporate law, 
 
 69. This has also been observed in the American context. Brett McDonnell, ESOP’s Failures: 
Fiduciary Duties When Managers of Employee-Owned Companies Vote To Entrench Themselves, 
2000 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 199, 260; William H. Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 
14 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 251, 263 (1993). Whether these fears on the part of workers are well-
founded is another question. Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1931, 1953 (1991) (“It is difficult even to trace a causal connection between takeovers and job loss.”). 
 70. E.g., Romano, supra note 14, at 129–30. 
 71. E.g., Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 Geo. L.J. 1725, 1727 (2006); Jens 
C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 477, 480 (2004) 
[hereinafter Dammann, Freedom]; Jens C. Dammann, Indeterminacy in Corporate Law: A Theoretical 
and Comparative Analysis, 49 Stan. J. Int’l L. 54, 68 (2013) [hereinafter Dammann, Indeterminacy]. 
 72. E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-Organization Law, 40 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 751, 791 (2005). 
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therefore, was to move its headquarters to another Member State.73 In 
practice, this option was far too complicated and costly to gain practical 
relevance.74 
Over the past fifteen years, the European Union has gradually 
moved toward greater choice in corporate law. This process began in 
1999, when the European Court of Justice, in its famous Centros 
judgment,75 found that the real seat doctrine violated European law.76 As 
a result of Centros and the cases that followed, European firms are now 
subject to the corporate law of the Member State where they are 
incorporated, even if their state of incorporation differs from their real 
seat state.77 This leaves firms free to choose the applicable corporate law 
by incorporating in the Member State of their choice.78 
However, for purposes of regulatory competition, Centros and its 
progeny had a vital shortcoming: they only concerned the ability of 
corporations to choose the applicable corporate law at the moment of 
formation. As a result, existing corporations still did not have the ability 
to reincorporate in order to change the applicable corporate law.79 Such 
reincorporation required corporations to be dissolved and formed anew 
in the state of destination—a move usually associated with significant 
adverse tax consequences.80 In other words, Centros only benefited newly 
formed corporations and was essentially useless to established firms.81 
In 2005, the European Union remedied this problem by adopting 
the so-called Cross-Border Merger Directive.82 Together with another 
directive exempting cross-border mergers from taxation, the Cross-
Border Merger Directive now allows corporations to merge with 
corporations in other E.U. Member States without incurring a tax 
 
 73. Dammann, Freedom, supra note 71, at 480; Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 68. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1484. 
 76. This holding was later confirmed and explicated in two other cases: Case C-208/00, 
Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9943; Case C-
167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-
10195. 
 77. E.g., William W. Bratton et al., How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A 
Comparative Analysis, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 347, 348 (2009). 
 78. E.g., Jens Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law, 38 Vand. J. Transnat’l 
L. 51, 56 (2005); Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 69. 
 79. E.g., Hanne Sondergaard Birkmose, A Market for Company Incorporations in the European 
Union?—Is Überseering the Beginning of the End?, 13 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 55, 60 (2005); Bratton 
et al., supra note 77, at 370. 
 80. Dammann, Freedom, supra note 71, at 490–91; Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 
69. 
 81. Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 69. 
 82. Directive 2005/56/EC, On Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, 2005 O.J. 
(L 310) 1 [hereinafter Cross-Border Merger Directive]. This directive had to be implemented by the 
end of 2007. Id. art. 19(1). 
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penalty.83 This means that E.U. corporations can now reincorporate in 
another Member State by forming a new corporation in that Member 
State and then merging the old corporation into the newly formed one.84 
However, despite the theoretical ability of corporations to 
reincorporate, the impact of corporate mobility has remained quite 
limited. For very small privately held firms, Centros managed to gain some 
limited importance. In the years immediately following Centros, an 
increasing number of entrepreneurs made use of their newfound mobility 
and set up small privately held firms in other member states to avoid the 
often much higher incorporation fees in their home state.85 Typically, 
they went to the United Kingdom, where incorporation costs are modest. 
Data presented in a landmark study by Marco Becht, Colin Mayer, and 
Hannes Wagner is particularly instructive on this point: In 2000—the 
year immediately following Centros—only 807 firms headquartered in 
Germany were formed as private limited companies (“PLCs”) under 
U.K. law.86 By 2004, that number increased to 10,263, and by 2006 it 
increased to 16,438.87 
Yet, more recent data suggest that even among small privately held 
firms, the interest in incorporating abroad might be waning.88 By 2008, 
the number of German-based businesses that were newly formed as U.K. 
PLCs had declined to 4884,89 and the year 2010 saw a further decline to 
1978.90 Concurrently, the number of firms formed as privately held 
corporations under German law continued to increase—from 57,299 in 
200891 to 69,474 in 2010.92 Even more crucially, the trend to make use of 
Centros always remained limited to very small privately held firms; it 
 
 83. See Council Directive 90/434/EEC, On the Common System of Taxation Applicable to 
Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares Concerning Companies of Different 
Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1 [hereinafter Merger Tax Directive], amended by Council Directive 
2005/19/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 58) 19. According to that Directive, “[a] merger or division shall not give rise 
to any taxation of capital gains calculated by reference to the difference between the real values of the 
assets and liabilities transferred and their values for tax purposes.” Id. art. 4 (1). 
 84. See Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 69. In the United States, corporations have 
long reincorporated via cross-border mergers. See Dammann, Freedom, supra note 71, at 489. 
 85. See Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 70. 
 86. Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 J. 
Corp. Fin. 241, 248 tbl.3 (2008). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 71. 
 89. Statistisches Bundesamt, Unternehmen und Arbeitsstätten: Gewerbeanzeigen: 
Dezember und Jahr 2008 at tbl.5 year 2008 (2009) [hereinafter: Statistisches Bundesamt 2008]. 
 90. Statistisches Bundesamt, Unternehmen und Arbeitsstätten: Gewerbeanzeigen: 
Dezember und Jahr 2010, at 14 [hereinafter: Statistisches Bundesamt 2010]. 
 91. Statistisches Bundesamt 2008, supra note 89, at 18 (reporting newly formed 
(“Newgründung”) Private Company Limited by Shares for 2008 as 4,884). 
 92. Statistisches Bundesamt 2010, supra note 90, at 14. 
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never caught on among the public corporations that are the subject of 
this Article.93 
Why public corporations fail to incorporate is not entirely clear. 
Possible reasons include language barriers,94 concerns about having to 
litigate important corporate matters before foreign—and therefore 
potentially unsympathetic—courts,95 conflicts of interest on the part of 
corporate lawyers who might be loath to lose their clients due to a 
change in the state of incorporation,96 and the fact that established firms 
might be heavily invested in the corporate law of their home state. In any 
case, it is clear that so far, public corporations do not see reincorporation 
in another Member State as a practical way of avoiding their home 
state’s laws.97 
II.  Traditional Justifications for Mandatory Law 
To understand why foreign jurisdictions rely more heavily on 
mandatory corporate law than the United States, it is helpful to begin by 
asking how mandatory law can be justified in the first place. The 
contractarian view of the corporation assumes that, as a general rule, the 
internal structure is best left to private ordering.98 Desiring to maximize 
the price that they can obtain for the shares of their enterprise, the 
owners of a firm will generally adopt value-maximizing governance 
arrangements in anticipation of taking the firm public. Why then would 
mandatory corporate law ever be needed? Scholars have traditionally 
given three main answers to this question, and while at least two of them 
remain controversial,99 they are worth reviewing briefly. 
 
 93. Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 70; Becht et al., supra note 86, at 242 (“Between 
2003 and 2006, over 67,000 new private limited companies were established in the U.K. from other 
E.U. Member States.”). However, they note that there is no evidence for migration among publicly 
traded firms, and, instead, stress that “[m]ost of the new foreign limited companies are small 
entrepreneurial firms.” Id.; see Bratton et al., supra note 77, at 385 (noting that regulatory competition 
is “limited to economically-negligible small entrepreneurs”). 
 94. Dammann, Freedom, supra note 71, at 492. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 505–06. 
 97. See Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 70 (“[C]orporate mobility in the European 
Union has thus-far remained a phenomenon whose importance is strictly limited to very small 
privately held firms.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1416, 1418 (1989) (arguing that a corporation is best understood as “a complex set of explicit and 
implicit contracts”); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 99 (1989). 
 99. See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory 
Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1617 (1989) (taking the position that only externalities 
constitute a persuasive justification for mandatory corporate law and that even then, federal 
mandatory law is only appropriate if the outcome of the federal political process is superior to the 
market solution). 
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A. Imperfect Pricing of Charter Terms 
To begin, it has been suggested that IPO markets might price 
charter terms imperfectly.100 This claim, if true, has far-reaching 
consequences for the efficiency of charter terms and the desirability of 
mandatory corporate law. As long as charter terms are accurately priced 
by IPO markets, entrepreneurs taking their company public will bear the 
full costs of any inefficient charter terms. It is then in their interest to 
choose the most efficient charter terms. 
By contrast, once one assumes that IPO markets fail to price charter 
terms accurately, it follows that some or all of the costs of inefficient 
charter terms will be borne by investors buying the shares of IPO firms. 
If the benefits of the inefficient terms accrue to the entrepreneurs taking 
the company public, it might actually be in their financial interest to 
include inefficient charter terms. In other words, the market no longer 
guarantees that IPO firms will choose efficient charter terms. Hence, 
mandatory corporate law norms might be needed to ensure that firms are 
subject to efficient rules. 
For many law and economics scholars, the claim that IPO markets 
are substantially imperfect at pricing charter terms is quite difficult to 
swallow;101 it runs counter to the so-called semi-strong version of the 
efficient capital market hypothesis, which holds that share prices fully 
reflect publicly available information—including publicly available 
information on charter terms.102 Despite some well-known evidence 
tending to show that markets are not completely efficient in pricing 
publicly available information,103 the semi-strong efficient capital market 
 
 100. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 713, 
740–42 (2003); cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 
84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 542, 571–72 (1990) (discussing various factors that might prevent IPO charter terms 
from being efficiently priced). 
 101. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
1549, 1563 (1989) (calling the claim that otherwise efficient markets will fail to price charter terms 
“puzzling”). 
 102. The terminology goes back to Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383 (1970) (distinguishing between weak, semi-strong, and strong 
forms of capital market efficiency). This definition of semi-strong capital market efficiency is now 
generally accepted. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on 
the Market Theory, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 907, 911 (1989) (discussing the semi-strong version of the 
efficient capital market hypothesis); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 555 (1984) (same). 
 103. Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and 
Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. Fin. 557, 580 (1987) (presenting evidence that markets overreact to 
news and are slow to correct pricing mistakes); Jay R. Ritter, The Buying and Selling Behavior of 
Individual Investors at the Turn of the Year, 43 J. Fin. 701 (1988) (presenting evidence that small firms 
tend to earn abnormally high results). These qualms about the limits of capital market efficiency are 
now taken more seriously in the legal literature as well. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of 
Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. Corp. L. 635, 636–67 (2003) (detailing 
the shortcomings of capital markets). 
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hypothesis has long been—and continues to be—widely regarded as a 
more or less accurate and proven description of how capital markets 
work.104 
Nonetheless, the imperfect pricing hypothesis is not easily 
dismissed, in part because the empirical literature on the efficiency of 
IPO pricing is mixed. On the one hand, at least one study suggests that 
underwriters’ treatment of publicly available information, while 
imperfect, comes close to being consistent with efficient pricing.105 On the 
other hand, various authors have presented evidence that IPO markets 
do not fully incorporate all publicly available information106 and in 
particular, that readily available public information can be used to 
predict IPO underpricing.107 In other words, the empirical literature on 
IPO pricing is hardly sufficiently settled to conclude whether charter 
terms are fully priced. 
Moreover, IPO charters are notoriously ill behaved. Although 
commentators tend to agree that antitakeover defenses108 in general and 
staggered boards in particular109 reduce shareholder wealth, such 
provisions are very common in IPO charters.110 Some experts have 
attempted to reconcile this finding with the efficient capital market 
hypothesis. For example, it has been suggested that at least at the IPO 
stage, such provisions might not be as inefficient as traditionally 
 
 104. E.g., Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 
2011 BYU L. Rev. 1371, 1397 n.152 (2011) (noting that empirical evidence “tends to support” the 
semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis). 
 105. See Michelle Lowry & G. William Schwert, Is the IPO Pricing Process Efficient?, 71 J. Fin. Econ. 
3, 25 (2004) (analyzing the efficiency of IPO pricing and concluding that “underwriters’ treatment of 
public information appears to be almost consistent with an efficient IPO pricing process”). 
 106. E.g., Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on 
the Table in IPOs?, 15 Rev. Fin. Stud. 413, 426 (2002) (presenting evidence that “underwriters do not 
fully adjust the offer price with respect to public information”); Daniel J. Bradley & Bradford D. 
Jordan, Partial Adjustment to Public Information and IPO Underpricing, 37 J. Fin. & Quantitative 
Analysis 595, 612 (2002) (“IPO offer prices only partially adjust to public information.”). 
 107. Bradley & Jordan, supra note 106, at 596. 
 108. See generally Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 
20 J. Fin. Econ. 377 (1988) (presenting evidence that the adoption of the most restrictive poison pills is 
associated with stock price declines); Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: 
Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 347 (1988) (presenting 
evidence that poison pills reduce shareholder wealth). But see generally Robert Comment & G. 
William Schwert, Poison Or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent and Wealth Effects of Modern 
Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1995) (presenting evidence that poison pills do not reduce 
the likelihood of takeovers and that poison pills are associated with higher takeover premiums). 
 109. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. Fin. Econ. 409, 
430 (2005) (concluding “that staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful 
reduction in firm value”); Bebchuk, supra note 100, at 719 (noting that “there are reasons to believe 
that strong antitakeover protections decrease share value”). 
 110. Klausner, supra note 56, at 1333 (noting that IPO charters commonly contain takeover 
defenses and, in particular, staggered boards). For a more detailed treatment, see Daines & Klausner, 
supra note 50. 
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believed,111 or that their popularity might be due to agency problems 
between the entrepreneurs and their lawyers.112 However, the most 
straightforward explanation for the proliferation of staggered board 
provisions in IPO charters is that pricing is imperfect.113 
B. Midstream Charter Amendments 
A second explanation for mandatory corporate law focuses on the 
potential for opportunistic midstream charter amendments.114 After a 
corporation has gone public, those in control of the corporation—be they 
managers or controlling shareholders—might seek to amend the charter 
in a way that benefits them at the expense of shareholders. Investors 
anticipate this and will only pay a price that reflects a discount for future 
opportunism. To overcome this problem, firms need a mechanism that 
allows them to signal that no opportunistic amendments will occur in the 
future. Mandatory law, so it is said, provides a solution to this problem.115 
The strength of this argument depends on how likely those in 
control are to change the charter in opportunistic ways. Accordingly, in 
the United States, where most corporations lack a controlling 
shareholder,116 the decisive question is whether managers have the power 
to push through charter amendments that decrease shareholder wealth. 
Critics of mandatory law have voiced some skepticism in this regard. 
Charter amendments have to be approved by the shareholders, and why 
 
 111. Bebchuk, supra note 100, at 732–33 (raising the possibility that the existence of antitakeover 
defenses in the IPO charter might make a subsequent move to dispersed ownership more likely and 
might therefore be preferable to investors). 
 112. Id. at 736–39. Yet another explanation has been suggested by Michael Klausner. According to 
Klausner, it might be “privately rational, but socially inefficient, for private equity funds to have their 
portfolio companies adopt takeover defenses” due to “private equity funds’ need to maintain a 
reputation for dealing well with successful managers of portfolio companies.” Michael Klausner, 
Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 755, 784 (2003). 
 113. Cf. Klausner, supra note 56, at 1335 (noting that the proliferation of antitakeover defenses in 
IPO charters “raises questions about whether governance terms are priced when they are included in 
the IPO charter”). 
 114. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 69, at 1593 (suggesting the risk of opportunistic charter 
amendments as a rationale for mandatory corporate law rules); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395, 1401 (1989) (arguing that mandatory 
rules might be needed to prevent opportunistic charter amendments). 
 115. E.g., Gordon, supra note 69, at 1593; Bebchuk, supra note 114, at 1401. 
 116. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 
157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1263, 1267 (2009) (“In the United States and the United Kingdom, most public 
companies do not have a controlling shareholder.”); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership 
Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 491–93 (1999) (showing that among the largest firms in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, most have dispersed ownership). But see Clifford G. Holderness, The 
Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1377, 1394 (2009) (presenting 
evidence that many public corporations in the United States have large blockholders). 
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would the shareholders approve charter amendments that harm them?117 
Defenders of mandatory corporate law have answered that question by 
citing tactics that allow managers to obtain shareholder approval for value-
decreasing charter amendments. They mention two such techniques in 
particular. First, they note that managers might simply speculate on the 
ignorance of shareholders hoping that the latter will vote in favor of 
resolutions proposed by the board without getting informed.118 Second, 
they emphasize that directors might resort to what is known as 
“bundling”—because charter amendments can only be proposed by the 
board of directors, the latter can “bundle” an amendment that decreases 
shareholder wealth with another one that increases shareholder wealth.119 
As long as the net effect of the bundle is to increase shareholder wealth, 
shareholders will find it in their interest to vote for the bundle despite 
the fact that one of its components is detrimental to their interests.120 
Assuming these techniques work reasonably well, the shareholder-approval 
requirement offers only imperfect protection against opportunistic 
charter amendments. In that case, mandatory law can be used to provide 
additional protection to shareholders. 
C. Externalities 
A third justification for mandatory corporate law focuses not on 
shareholder wealth, but on corporate law’s effects on third parties. To 
the extent that corporate law norms produce positive or negative 
externalities, one cannot assume that corporations will adopt the most 
efficient rules. Accordingly, mandatory law might be necessary to ensure 
efficient outcomes.121 
Perhaps the most well-known example involves the principle of 
limited liability. When the corporation’s creditors deal with the 
corporation voluntarily, limited liability does not impose externalities. 
After all, creditors can protect themselves by demanding surety or 
insisting on higher interest rates. However, as Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman have pointed out, there are also many involuntary 
creditors, such as tort victims, who are unable to bargain for protections.122 
 
 117. Romano, supra note 99, at 1607–14 (arguing that the shareholder approval requirement might 
limit the ability of managers to push through value-decreasing charter amendments). 
 118. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1472 (1992) (noting, with respect to 
reincorporation decisions, that shareholders might vote with management because they are 
insufficiently informed). 
 119. Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 864–65. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Romano, supra note 99, at 1616 (“[T]here is . . . a role for mandatory corporate law when 
externalities are present.”). 
 122. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1920 (1991). 
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With respect to such involuntary creditors, corporations cannot be 
expected to adopt the most efficient liability rules; rather, they will seek to 
minimize personal liability.123 Accordingly, mandatory law might be 
needed to secure efficient outcomes. 
III.  Transnational Differences 
The central question that this Article seeks to address is a 
comparative one: Why do foreign jurisdictions rely so much more heavily 
on mandatory corporate law than the United States? This Article argues 
that the traditional justifications for mandatory corporate law constitute 
an important building block for answering this question. More 
specifically, it demonstrates that the very considerations that are thought 
(by some) to justify mandatory corporate law rules in the United States 
tend to be much more compelling in foreign countries. Put differently, if 
one believes that the traditional justifications for mandatory corporate 
law justify the existence of some mandatory rules in the United States, 
then one should not be surprised to see a much larger number of 
mandatory rules in foreign jurisdictions. 
A. The Pricing of Charter Terms 
The imperfect-pricing justification distinctly demonstrates the point 
that the traditional reasons for mandatory corporate law are more 
compelling abroad than they are in the United States. As noted above, it 
has become common to defend mandatory corporate law on the ground 
that IPO markets are imperfect at pricing charter terms. How much 
weight one is willing to accord this explanation depends on how strongly 
one believes in the efficiency of capital markets. Scholars who believe 
that the efficient capital market hypothesis in its semi-strong form is 
overall a good description of how capital markets work will generally be 
less willing to accept the imperfect-pricing hypothesis than scholars who 
view the efficient capital market hypothesis as far removed from reality. 
Either way, it is crucial to note that the efficiency of capital markets 
is a matter of degree. Some capital markets are more efficient than 
others;124 the more efficient they are, the more difficult it is to justify 
mandatory corporate law with the possibility of imperfect pricing. 
 
 123. Id. at 1881 (“[S]trong empirical evidence indicates that increasing exposure to tort liability has led to 
the widespread reorganization of business firms to exploit limited liability to evade damage claims.”). 
 124. There is a substantial literature examining the efficiency of capital markets in various corners 
of the globe and often coming up with mixed results. See, e.g., Mahdi M. Hadi, Review of Capital 
Market Efficiency: Some Evidence from Jordanian Market, 3 Int. Res. J. Fin. & Econ. 13, 22 (2006) 
(finding mixed evidence regarding semi-strong capital market efficiency in the Jordanian capital 
market); Frimpong Joseph Magnus, Capital Market Efficiency: An Analysis of Weak-Form Efficiency 
on the Ghana Stock Exchange, 5 J. Money, Investment & Banking, 5, 11 (2008) (presenting evidence 
that not even weak-form capital market efficiency is given on the Ghana Stock Exchange); Nicolaas 
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Despite the recent handwringing about the United States losing 
ground to other countries,125 it is widely acknowledged that the United 
States has the most efficient capital markets in the world.126 The empirical 
literature supports this view; while the literature comparing capital 
market efficiency across countries is still in its infancy and does not focus 
on the specific problem of IPO pricing, there has recently been some 
evidence that U.S. capital markets are in fact more efficient than those of 
other countries.127 
These findings are not surprising. While there continues to be some 
disagreement about the determinants of capital market efficiency—
regarding, for example, the reasons for why some capital markets are 
more efficient than others—it is clear that there are two features that set 
U.S. capital markets apart from their international competitors. 
Sheer size is one factor. The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) 
and the NASDAQ are the dominant stock exchanges in terms of 
domestic market capitalization at $14.1 trillion and $4.6 trillion, 
respectively. The runner-ups are the Tokyo Stock Exchange ($3.5 
trillion) and the London Stock Exchange ($3.4 trillion).128 Even then, the 
market capitalization of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is only one fourth 
that of the NYSE. This U.S. advantage in size is likely to matter not least 
because efficient IPO pricing crucially relies on sophisticated 
underwriters, and a competitive market for sophisticated underwriters is 
more likely to emerge in countries with well-developed capital markets. 
Just as important, the United States has particularly stringent 
securities law and what is widely thought to be an unparalleled 
 
Groenewold et al., The Efficiency of the Chinese Stock Market and the Role of the Banks, 14 J. Asian 
Econ. 593 (2003) (presenting evidence of departures from weak-form efficiency). 
 125. Of course, gloomy warnings are nothing new. See, e.g., Egon Guttman, Federal Regulation of 
Transfer Agents, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 281, 328 (1985) (arguing that without measures to improve the 
efficiency of America’s capital markets, “a loss of preeminence is inevitable”). 
 126. E.g., James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider’s Look into the Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: 
A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz Deutschland, 19 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 1, 66 (1996) (“[T]he New York Stock Exchange is generally considered the most efficient capital 
market in the world.”); Mark J. Hanson, Becoming One: The SEC Should Join the World in Adopting the 
International Financial Reporting Standards, 28 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 521, 539 (2006) (“The 
U.S. has the most efficient capital markets in the world.”); Eric M. Sherbet, Bridging the GAAP: 
Accounting Standards for Foreign SEC Registrants, 29 Int’l L. 875, 875 (1995) (“[T]he United States has 
the largest, most efficient capital markets in the world.”); Louis M. Solomon, International Comity at the 
Crossroads: Practical Implications and Public Policy Challenges, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 269, 284 (2004) 
(“America has developed the world’s most efficient capital market system.”). 
 127. See generally Daniel O. Cajueiro & Benjamin M. Tabak, Ranking Efficiency for Emerging 
Equity Markets II, 23 Chaos, Solitons, & Fractals 671 (2005) (finding that the U.S. stock market is 
more efficient than stock markets in emerging economies); Enrico Onali & John Goddard, Are 
European Equity Markets Efficient? New Evidence from Fractal Analysis, 20 Int. Rev. Fin. Analysis 
59 (2011) (presenting evidence that some of the smaller European stock markets are less efficient than 
stock markets in the United States or the United Kingdom). 
 128. World Fed’n of Exchs., 2012 WFE Market Highlights 6 tbl.2 (2013), available at 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/statistics/2012%20WFE%20Market%20Highlights.pdf. 
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enforcement structure.129 As John Coffee has noted, “the United States 
pursues securities law violations through both public and private 
enforcement with an intensity unmatched elsewhere in the world.”130 
Thus, the United States has so far preserved its edge with respect to 
capital market efficiency. Foreign capital markets are certainly becoming 
more competitive—an issue to which this Article turns later131—but they 
still have a long way to go to catch up to the United States. That, in turn, 
has obvious implications for the efficiency of mandatory corporate law. 
Given the strength of U.S. capital markets, imperfect pricing arguments 
for mandatory corporate law are quite simply more difficult to make here 
than they are in other countries where capital markets function less well. 
B. Opportunistic Midstream Amendments 
The second traditional justification for mandatory corporate law—
the threat of opportunistic midstream charter amendments—also proves 
more compelling abroad than it does here in the United States. The 
plausibility of the midstream amendments argument depends on the 
severity of the risk that, in the absence of mandatory law, those in 
control of the corporation can successfully adopt charter amendments 
that decrease shareholder wealth. Accordingly, the question is whether 
the risk of such amendments is lower in the United States than it is 
elsewhere. The answer to that question is yes, and the underlying reason 
is quite simple: most foreign countries have much more concentrated 
share ownership, and more concentrated ownership translates into a 
greater risk for opportunistic charter amendments. 
By international standards, share ownership in the United States 
and the United Kingdom is relatively dispersed.132 Although it is not 
uncommon for public corporations in the United States to have large 
shareholders owning a substantial portion of their stock,133 the existence 
of a controlling shareholder is the exception rather than the rule, 
especially among very large companies.134 By contrast, in most European 
countries, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom, ownership 
 
 129. For an empirical assessment, see Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private 
Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. Fin. Econ. 207, 211, 214 tbl.2 (2009) 
(focusing on “regulator’s budgetary resources and staffing levels” and showing that the United States 
does exceptionally well on both measures). 
 130. John Coffee, Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 309 (2007). 
 131. See infra Part V. 
 132. La Porta et al., supra note 116, at 491–93 (1999) (showing that among the largest firm in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, most have dispersed ownership). 
 133. Holderness, supra note 116, at 1394 (presenting evidence that many public corporations in the 
United States have large blockholders). 
 134. See supra note 109. 
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is far more concentrated, and the existence of a controlling shareholder is 
the norm.135 Incidentally, the same is true in Asia.136 
This difference in ownership concentration has important 
implications for the likelihood of opportunistic charter amendments. In 
the United States, where the salient conflict is between managers and 
shareholders, the decisive question is to what extent managers can push 
through charter amendments that decrease shareholder wealth. Their 
ability to do so is limited by the necessity of obtaining shareholder approval. 
Admittedly, there might be ways to secure shareholder approval even 
for those amendments that decrease shareholder wealth. In particular, the 
board might seek to rely on shareholder ignorance or it might bundle 
unattractive charter amendments with more attractive measures to gain 
shareholder approval.137 However, the usefulness of these tactics declines 
as the desired charter amendment becomes more damaging to the 
interests of the shareholders. Bundling, for example, can only work to 
the extent that management has a sweetener to offer that offsets the 
detrimental impact of the charter amendment. Similarly, the more 
damaging the amendment is to shareholder interests, the more difficult it 
will be for directors to rely on the ignorance of shareholders to obtain 
shareholder approval. 
Compared to the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders, the one between controlling and minority shareholders is far 
more difficult to contain. Given that the controlling shareholder controls 
the board, the requirement of a board resolution as a prerequisite for 
amending the charter does not constrain him. Similarly, the necessity to 
obtain shareholder approval is no obstacle to a shareholder who owns a 
majority of the shares, and not much of an obstacle to a shareholder who 
owns close to a majority of the shares. In other words, shareholder 
 
 135. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1645 (2006) (“[E]xcluding the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the worldwide corporate governance landscape has a monolithic feature: control of 
publicly traded corporations is typically lodged in a single individual, family, or group.”); Marco Becht 
& Colin Mayer, Introduction to The Control of Corporate Europe 1, 19 tbl.1.1 (Fabrizio Barca & 
Marco Becht eds., 2001) (presenting data on ownership concentration for publicly traded corporations 
in Europe and the United States showing, inter alia, that largest voting block was 57% in the median 
German corporation, 56% in the median Belgian corporation, 54.5% in the median Italian 
corporation, and 52% in the median Austrian corporation, but only 9.9% in the median U.S. 
corporation); Marco Becht & Alisa Roell, Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison, 
43 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1049 (1999) (presenting evidence of much higher ownership concentrations in 
continental Europe than in the United Kingdom or in the United States); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. 
Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. Fin. Econ. 365, 378 (2002) 
(studying a sample of over five-thousand corporations from Western Europe and showing that more 
than 44% are controlled by a single family). 
 136. Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large 
Shareholdings, 57 J. Fin. 2741, 2742 (2002) (noting that in East Asian firms, “the largest shareholder is 
often able to control a firm’s operations with a relatively small direct stake in its cash-flow rights”). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 119–120. 
J - Dammann_17(Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:34 PM 
468 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:441 
approval requirements are of little use in controlling opportunistic 
charter amendments in countries where controlling shareholders are the 
norm. That, in turn, makes mandatory law more attractive because 
mandatory law offers an alternative way to prevent controlling 
shareholder opportunism. 
At this point, skeptics might point out that there are other 
mechanisms aside from mandatory corporate law that can protect 
minority shareholders against opportunistic controllers and thereby 
compensate for the uselessness of the shareholder approval requirement. 
In particular, these mechanisms include: a judicial review of the fairness 
of the amendment,138 supermajority requirements,139 and majority-of-the-
minority requirements.140 However, all of these alternative mechanisms 
have significant limitations. This is not to say that they are completely 
without merit. Rather, each of them can play a certain role in corporate 
governance. But the decisive question is whether they are sufficiently 
effective to contain controlling shareholder opportunism as effectively as 
shareholder approval requirements contain managerial opportunism. 
There are good reasons to think that that is not the case. 
1. Fairness Review 
A judicial assessment of the fairness of charter amendments seems 
particularly problematic. Both practical experience and theoretical 
considerations suggest that such a fairness review would be of little help 
except in the most extreme cases. 
As a practical matter, it is worth noting that there already exists a 
widespread tendency among corporate law systems to allow some type of 
fairness review of shareholder resolutions. In Delaware, minority 
shareholders can invoke the controlling shareholder’s duty of loyalty.141 
Similar principles apply elsewhere, including in France (abus de 
majorité),142 Germany (Treuepflichtverletzung),143 and the United Kingdom 
(unfair prejudice).144 
In practice, however, it is quite difficult for minority shareholders to 
challenge charter amendments on these grounds. Of course, the fact that 
European jurisdictions are reluctant to use judicial fairness review to 
 
 138. See infra Part III.B.1.  
 139. See infra Part III.B.2.  
 140. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 141. See, e.g., Oliver v. Bos. Univ., No. Civ.A 16570, 2006 WL 1064169, at *18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 
2006) (holding that the duty of loyalty “requires that a ‘controlling’ shareholder not act, or cause its 
representatives to act, in such a manner as to deal unfairly with the minority shareholders”). 
 142. Michel Germain et al., 1 Traité de Droit Commercial 369 (18th ed. 2002). 
 143. For a survey on fiduciary duties in German corporate law, see Karsten Schmidt, 
Gesellschaftsrecht 587–95 (4th ed. 2002). 
 144. See, e.g., Paul L. Davies, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 681–708 (8th ed. 2008). 
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police charter amendments145 might not come as a surprise. Given the 
prevalence of mandatory corporate law, these jurisdictions simply offer 
fewer opportunities for charter amendments in the first place. However, 
even in Delaware where there are few mandatory norms, and where the 
Delaware Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged the possibility 
that, given the right circumstances, a charter amendment might violate 
the duty of loyalty,146 one looks in vain for a case in which a charter 
amendment was actually declared void for that reason.147 
It is easy to see why corporate law jurisdictions are reluctant to 
subject charter amendments to a judicial fairness review. Unlike in 
ordinary self-dealing transactions, in which a controlling shareholder 
enters into a contract with the corporation, it is difficult to come up with 
clear guidelines as to when charter amendments are unfair. When 
fiduciary duties are used to contain shareholder opportunism, the goal is 
usually quite straightforward—the law seeks to ensure that the 
shareholder does not enrich himself at the expense of the corporation 
and hence the other shareholders. In case of charter amendments, 
however, the situation is more complicated. Charter amendments 
typically affect the balance of power within the corporation. For 
example, a corporation might switch from cumulative voting to majority 
voting.148 Any change in the allocation of power necessarily leaves some 
shareholders less powerful while making others more powerful. If this 
were enough to constitute a duty of loyalty violation, many desirable 
charter amendments would become impossible. Hence, one must 
conceive of additional tests, such as whether the charter amendment is in 
the interest of the corporation. However, courts are notoriously ill-
positioned to determine what might or might not be in the corporation’s 
interest, explaining why they have historically been hesitant to apply 
judicial fairness review to charter amendments. As a leading French 
commentator notes, the prevailing restrictive interpretation of the 
 
 145. For example, in Germany, only very few cases deal with the controlling shareholder’s 
fiduciary duty, and none of them concerns a charter amendment. For a review of the relevant case law, 
see Schmidt, supra note 143, at 587–95. Regarding French law, see Germain et al., supra note 142, at 
369 (noting the demanding requirements of the abus-de-majorité doctrine). 
 146. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). The Chancery Court, too, has suggested that 
charter amendments can be subject to the entire fairness standard. President & Fellows of Harvard 
Coll. v. Glancy, No. Civ.A. 18790, 2003 WL 21026784, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2003) (“Whether the 
business judgment rule or the entire fairness doctrine is applicable to [a stock option plan and related 
charter amendments] turns on whether the defendants had a financial interest sufficient to render 
them incapable of exercising objective business judgment.”). 
 147. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 83 (Del. 1990) (applying the business judgment rule); In re 
Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 334 (Del. 1993) (declaring moot the question regarding the 
standard of scrutiny to be applied). 
 148. Majority voting is the default under Delaware law, but the certificate of incorporation can 
provide for cumulative voting. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 214 (2013). 
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relevant French doctrine has the great advantage of not allowing courts 
to be drawn into running the firm in the place of its owners.149 
2. Supermajority Requirements 
In light of the difficulty inherent in any attempt to scrutinize the 
substantive fairness of charter amendments, it might seem tempting to 
focus instead on procedural mechanisms that constrain controlling 
shareholders. Supermajority requirements are perhaps the most obvious 
examples of such mechanisms. 
Indeed, whereas Delaware requires only a simple majority for a 
charter amendment,150 many other jurisdictions specify a higher 
threshold. French law, for example, requires a two-thirds majority,151 and 
both German152 and U.K.153 law demand a three-fourths majority. 
However, while Delaware law might only require a simple majority to 
change the charter,154 that simple majority refers to the outstanding 
shares entitled to vote.155 By contrast, the supermajority requirements 
common in other countries such as France, Germany, or the United 
Kingdom refer to the shares present or represented at the shareholder 
meeting, or even to the votes cast.156 
This difference matters because in practice, only a fraction of the 
outstanding shares tend to be represented at the shareholder meeting. 
For example, a study of shareholder meetings of listed Belgian 
companies found that on average, only 57.2% of the outstanding shares 
were represented at the shareholder meeting.157 For the largest German 
corporations, the relevant fraction has been shown to be around 58 to 
 
 149. Germain et al., supra note 142, at 369. 
 150. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1). 
 151. Code de commerce [C. com] art. L225-96(3) (Fr.). 
 152. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, last amended 
by Gesetz [G], Dec. 22, 2011, BGBl. I. at 3044, § 179(2) (Ger.). 
 153. Companies Act, 2006, c.46, §§ 21(1), 283(1) (U.K.). 
 154. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (requiring the affirmative vote of a majority of the 
outstanding stock entitled to vote on the amendment). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c.46, § 283(5) (U.K.), (“A resolution passed on a poll taken at 
a meeting is passed by a majority of not less than 75% if it is passed by members representing not less 
than 75% of the total voting rights of the members who (being entitled to do so) vote in person or by 
proxy on the resolution.”); Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 
1089, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 22, 2011, BGBl. I. at 3044, § 179(2) (Ger.) (requiring three 
fourths of the shares present or represented at the shareholder meeting to be voted for the charter 
amendment). 
 157. Christoph Van der Elst, Attendance of Shareholders and the Impact of Regulatory Corporate 
Governance Reforms: an Empirical Assessment of the Situation in Belgium, 5 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 
471, 506 (2004). 
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59%.158 The impact of such attendance is dramatic. Assume that there are 
one million shares outstanding. If 40% of the shares fail to be present or 
represented at the shareholder meeting, then a three-fourths supermajority 
requirement in the European style translates into a requirement that 
450,000 shares—or 45% of all outstanding shares—approve the charter 
amendment—less than what is needed under Delaware law. In practice, 
therefore, the “supermajority requirements” found in Europe might not 
offer minority shareholders any more protection than Delaware law. 
The fact that European jurisdictions do not adamantly attempt to 
control shareholders by adopting stricter supermajority requirements 
suggests that such requirements have their limitations. In fact, 
supermajority requirements come with obvious drawbacks. Most 
importantly, it is difficult to impose supermajority requirements that are 
meaningful without being insurmountable given that ownership 
concentrations vary across corporations. For example, a rule requiring all 
charter amendments to be approved by three quarters of all outstanding 
shares will have a very different impact depending on whether the 
controlling shareholder holds forty or eighty percent of the outstanding 
shares. In the former case, the rule makes charter amendments all but 
impossible and thus offers little more flexibility than a rule making the 
relevant corporate law provisions mandatory. In the latter case—where 
the controlling shareholder owns enough shares to meet the 
supermajority requirement—the supermajority rule proves entirely 
useless for purposes of protecting the minority shareholders. In other 
words, given the fact that levels of ownership concentration differ across 
firms, it is all but impossible to impose a supermajority requirement that 
does not misfire in one of the two ways described above. 
Supermajority requirements also raise the inevitable risk of hold-
ups:159 while protecting minority shareholders, supermajority requirements 
also offer the minority shareholders a chance to extort unjustified 
concessions from the corporation in exchange for their consent.160 At first 
glance, this might not seem to matter much when the alternative is a 
mandatory corporate law rule; after all, the fact that the controlling 
shareholder is willing to meet the possibly illegitimate demands made by 
the minority shareholders demonstrates that he prefers that outcome 
over being unable to change the charter at all. In reality, however, the 
situation is more complicated. To gain the desired supermajority, the 
 
 158. Christoph Van der Elst, Shareholder Rights and Shareholder Activism: The Role of the 
General Meeting of Shareholders, 60 Belgrade L. Rev. 39, 62 (2012) (focusing on DAX 30-companies 
and finding attendance of 58.2% in 2009 and 57% in 2010). 
 159. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1911, 1937 (1996). 
 160. Richard Holden, Supermajority Voting Rules (June 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=625122. 
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controlling shareholder does not have to pay off all the minority 
shareholders. Rather, she needs only to bridge the distance between her 
own shareholdings and the fraction required to reach the supermajority 
threshold; it is enough, then, for her to pay off some of the minority 
shareholders. In the worst case scenario, the supermajority requirement 
not only fails to prevent the controlling shareholder from pushing through 
a charter amendment that reduces shareholder wealth, but it causes her to 
use corporate funds to bribe some of the minority shareholders in order to 
reach the supermajority requirement. For example, in exchange for 
approving the charter amendment, some of the corporation’s non-
controlling blockholders might secure lucrative contracts with the 
corporation. The result is that the other minority shareholders are even 
worse off than they would be without the supermajority requirement; 
they are forced to accept the charter amendment while the value of their 
shares is reduced as a result of the bribes paid.161 
3. Majority-of-the-Minority Requirements 
A more promising technique for avoiding opportunistic charter 
amendments involves so-called majority-of-the-minority requirements. 
In other words, charter amendments can be made contingent upon 
approval by the minority shareholders. 
European countries have shown no appetite for this particular 
approach as a mechanism for preventing opportunistic charter 
amendments.162 In Delaware, by contrast, the situation is more complex. 
Under the Delaware Supreme Court’s caselaw, self-dealing transactions 
involving a controlling shareholder are subject to the so-called entire 
fairness standard.163 However, approval by the disinterested shareholders 
will shift the burden of proof from the corporation to the plaintiff.164 In 
 
 161. Of course, in a perfect world, the rules governing self-dealing would be policed so effectively 
as to render bribes unfeasible. In the real world, however, bargains of this type can be quite difficult to 
prevent, especially in countries with ineffective courts. 
 162. Regarding Germany, see Schmidt, supra note 143, at 910–20 (describing the law applicable to 
charter amendments). Regarding France, see Germain et al., supra note 142, at 609–14 (describing 
the law applicable to charter amendments). In the United Kingdom, under the so-called Listing Rules, 
approval by the disinterested shareholders becomes relevant with respect to transactions between the 
corporation and another party. See Listing Rules, 2013, §§ 11.1.7(3)–(4) (U.K.). Under Listing Rule 
section 11.1.7(3), the company must obtain shareholder approval before entering into a related party 
transaction, and under section 11.1.7(4), the interested party, e.g. the controlling shareholder, is 
precluded from voting on this matter. Id. 
 163. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997). 
 164. Id. At least in one area—namely freeze-out mergers—the Delaware Chancery Court has now 
embraced an approach that is more generous to the controlling shareholder. If the merger is approved 
by both a committee of independent directors and the minority shareholders, then the Chancery Court 
accords the transaction the protection of the business judgment rule. In re MFW S’holder Litig., 
67 A.3d 496, 502 (Del. Ch. 2013). It remains to be seen whether the Delaware Supreme Court 
approves of this approach. 
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other words, minority shareholder approval is not mandated, but the law 
provides a strong incentive to procure such approval. In principle, 
therefore, the U.S. experience suggests that majority-of-the-minority 
requirements can be valuable mechanisms for addressing the challenges 
posed by controlling shareholders. In practice, of course, this has been 
less true where charter amendments are concerned. The incentive to 
seek shareholder approval exists only where the entire fairness standard 
applies in the first place. So far, Delaware courts have not applied the 
entire fairness standard to charter amendments despite hinting that they 
will do so when the circumstances are right, such as when the board has 
pushed through a charter amendment for the sole purpose of entrenching 
the incumbent directors.165 
As with other mechanisms aimed at protecting minority shareholders, 
there are reasons behind the reluctance to subject charter amendments to 
majority-of-the-minority approval. To begin, there is the concern that 
minority shareholders are insufficiently well-informed to impose 
meaningful constraints on shareholder opportunism. Of course, rational 
ignorance is a general problem in the context of shareholder voting. But 
when it comes to minority shareholder approval requirements, that 
problem is more severe than usual. By focusing only on minority 
shareholders, one excludes the shareholder (namely the controller) who 
is most likely to be informed. Differently put, it is one thing to expect 
blockholders in the United States to be sufficiently well-informed to 
constrain managerial opportunism. It is quite another to expect minority 
shareholders to be informed well enough to constrain controlling 
shareholders—especially in those cases where control lies in the hands of a 
group of shareholders that includes some or all of the corporation’s large 
blockholders. 
To make matters worse, some foreign jurisdictions have structured 
the voting process in a way that undermines the efficacy of minority 
shareholder voting. Germany is a case in point. German law allows banks 
to obtain a general authorization from their customers to exercise voting 
rights on their behalf.166 Once such a general authorization has been 
granted, the bank, even though it is required to act in the shareholder’s 
best interest, will exercise its own discretion in deciding how to vote, 
unless the shareholder gives specific instructions.167 As a practical matter, 
this means that minority shareholder votes are largely directed by banks 
 
 165. See President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Glancy, No. Civ.A. 18790, 2003 WL 21026784, at 
*21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2003) (suggesting that charter amendments can be subject to the entire fairness 
standard). 
 166. Cf. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, last 
amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 22, 2011, BGBl. I. at 3044, § 135 (Ger.) (governing the exercise of 
voting rights by banks on behalf of their customers). 
 167. Id. 
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since only a small fraction of minority shareholders make use of their 
right to issue specific voting instructions.168 This mechanism, known as 
Depotstimmrecht (“depositionary voting right”), has the obvious 
advantage of addressing minority shareholder passivity in the sense that 
it makes it much more likely that the voting rights of minority 
shareholders will be exercised. At the same time, however, it creates a 
new principal-agent conflict. Banks that might have their own business 
relationships with the corporation or the controller might not always be 
scrupulous in adhering to the best interest of minority shareholders when 
casting their vote.169 As a result, charter amendments might be approved 
by the minority shareholders despite the fact that they are detrimental to 
the minority shareholders’ interests. 
Finally, majority-of-the-minority requirements raise concerns about 
bribes that are similar, if somewhat less severe, to those discussed with 
respect to supermajority requirements. As in the case of supermajority 
requirements, there is the risk that the controller will use corporate funds 
to bribe a sufficient number of minority shareholders, all at the expense 
of those who oppose the charter amendment. 
In sum, then, the basic problem remains. In countries with dispersed 
ownership, managers seeking opportunistic charter amendments can at 
least to some extent be constrained via shareholder approval requirements. 
In countries where controlling shareholders are the norm, such 
requirements are largely worthless. While there are various alternative 
mechanisms that can be used to prevent opportunistic charter 
amendments, all of them have their limitations and none of them are 
widely used to invalidate charter amendments. This has obvious 
implications for the usefulness of mandatory corporate law norms. When 
it comes to preventing opportunistic charter amendments, mandatory 
corporate law norms are likely to be more useful in foreign countries 
with concentrated ownership than they are in the United States. 
C. Externalities 
The third justification for mandatory law pertains to the protection 
of non-shareholder interests. To the extent that corporate law norms 
produce positive or negative externalities, one cannot assume that 
corporations will adopt the most efficient rules. Accordingly, mandatory 
law might be necessary to ensure efficient outcomes.170 
 
 168. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A 
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73, 88 n.83 (1995) 
(“Although depository shareholders do have the right to direct their vote, only about 2–3% do so.”). 
 169. E.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 168, at 89 (stressing the existence of a “significant conflict of 
interest”). 
 170. Romano, supra note 99, at 1617 (“[T]here is . . . a role for mandatory corporate law when 
externalities are present.”). 
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At first glance, this consideration offers a ready explanation for the 
stronger reliance on mandatory norms that characterize many foreign 
corporate law systems. Whereas U.S. corporate law is widely thought to 
focus on shareholder wealth maximization as its primary objective,171 
many foreign jurisdictions, especially in Europe, have traditionally 
defined the corporate objective much more broadly, concentrating not 
just on shareholder wealth but also placing substantial emphasis on the 
protection of other constituencies such as employees and other 
creditors.172 
However, if the question is whether mandatory law is more efficient 
in foreign countries than it is in the United States, then pointing to the 
different goals of corporate law systems is not enough; the goals of 
corporate law themselves can be chosen based on efficiency 
considerations. Indeed, according to the prevailing view among U.S. 
scholars, the reason U.S. corporate law focuses, and should focus, on 
maximizing shareholder wealth is not that other constituents do not 
matter; rather, shareholder wealth maximization is deemed the 
appropriate goal for corporate law because it is thought to be more 
efficient than other models, and because non-shareholder constituencies 
are better protected by other means.173 
 
 171. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric 
on Corporate Norms, 31 J. Corp. L. 675, 676 (2006) (“For the past few decades, corporate scholars 
have agreed almost universally that the shareholder primacy norm most accurately captures the 
corporation’s personality and purpose.”). Of course, two caveats are worth making. First, some U.S. 
scholars have long argued that U.S. law places more emphasis—and indeed should place more 
emphasis—on the protection of other constituencies than the shareholder primacy model 
acknowledges. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 320–21 (1999) (arguing that existing features of U.S. corporate law can be 
more readily explained by a “mediating hierarchy model” rather than by the shareholder primacy 
model). Second, the prevailing view that U.S. corporate law focuses primarily on shareholder wealth 
does not imply that U.S. law leaves no room for taking the interests of other constituencies into 
account. The most obvious example to the contrary are the so-called other-constituency statutes that 
many U.S. jurisdictions have adopted. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-756 (2012) (authorizing 
directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of the corporation’s employees when determining the best 
interests of the corporation); Fla. Stat. § 607.0830(3) (2012) (providing that directors might consider 
such factors as “the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any action on the employees”). Overall, 
no less than twenty-five states have enacted some form of constituency statute. Ann E. Conaway, 
Lessons To Be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom To Contract in Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law 
Might Inform Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 789, 806 (2008). 
 172.  See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder 
Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 641, 645 (noting that “[t]he intellectual history 
seems to support a greater focus on shareholder welfare in the US” than in Europe); Martin Gelter, 
The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in 
Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 Harv. Int’l L.J. 129, 176 (2009) (“Continental laws like those 
of France and Germany are usually said to have a broader corporate objective and a dearth 
of shareholder primacy.”). But see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 469 (finding “ideological 
hegemony” of the shareholder primacy model). 
 173. See, e.g., John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law 1, 
28–29 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
J - Dammann_17(Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:34 PM 
476 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:441 
Accordingly, the decisive question is whether mandatory corporate 
law is more efficient in other countries because focusing on the 
protection of non-shareholder constituents is a more efficient goal in 
those countries than it is in the United States. 
1. Creditor Protection 
Third party creditors are one of the major non-shareholder 
constituencies playing a role in foreign corporate law systems: 
traditionally, many foreign jurisdictions—especially in Europe—are 
thought to place much more emphasis on creditor protection than the 
United States. 
Of course, all corporate law systems protect creditors to some 
extent. More specifically, corporate laws generally impose distribution 
constraints to the effect that assets necessary to pay back creditors 
cannot be distributed to the shareholders. This basic constraint can be 
found around the world,174 and it must be mandatory to protect creditors 
from shareholder opportunism. Delaware is no exception to this rule.175 
However, jurisdictions differ on whether to provide an additional 
layer of protection for creditors via so-called legal capital rules. In 
corporate law, legal capital rules serve essentially two functions.176 First, 
they impose minimum capitalization requirements; that is, they specify 
the amount of equity capital that the founders of a corporation must 
provide.177 Second, they impose an additional distribution constraint: 
corporations formed in jurisdictions with legal capital requirements can 
only pay dividends or repurchase stock to the extent that their net assets 
exceed the legal capital.178 
In the United States, legal capital requirements play a minor role. 
Some corporation laws do not provide for legal capital at all; in others, 
such as Delaware,179 corporations are free to select a certain legal capital, 
 
 174. See, e.g., id. at 116, 131 (“Company laws generally restrict distributions to shareholders.”). 
 175. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2013) (mandating that the corporation can only pay 
dividends out of the surplus or out of the net profits for the current or preceding fiscal year); id. 
§ 102(b)(7) (providing that the liability of directors for unlawful dividend payments cannot be limited 
or eliminated in the certificate of incorporation). 
 176. Legal capital rules can also be relevant to bankruptcy law, but that aspect is beyond the scope 
of this Article. Armour et al., supra note 173, at 134 (noting that legal capital requirements can be 
combined with recapitalization requirements in order to provide an incentive to promote early filing 
for bankruptcy). 
 177. Id. at 130–31. 
 178. Id. at 131–33. 
 179. In Delaware, the legal capital cannot be less than the aggregate par value of the par value 
shares issued by the corporation. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 154(1) (providing that whenever the 
corporation issues par value shares, the “the capital of the corporation in respect of such shares shall 
be an amount equal to the aggregate par value of such shares having a par value”); id. § 242(a)(4) 
(preventing the corporation from lowering its legal capital below the aggregate par value). However, 
the corporation can avoid these rules by issuing non-par value shares. 
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but there is no mandatory minimum capital.180 In Europe, by contrast, 
minimum legal capital requirements can be found both at the European 
Union and at the country level, which draws the scorn of corporate law 
scholars, many of whom believe such capital rules to be inefficient.181 
Regardless of the efficiency question, the most stunning aspect of 
Europe’s legal capital rules is how little economic significance they bear 
on public corporations. E.U. law currently prescribes a minimum legal 
capital of 25,000 Euros—or about $34,000—for public corporations.182 
For these corporations, that amount is trivial. Some Member States have 
opted to prescribe higher legal capital requirements, something that E.U. 
law explicitly allows, but the requirements are still easily achievable. For 
example, the minimum capital requirements for public corporations is 
37,000 Euros in France,183 50,000 Euros in Germany,184 50.000 pounds in 
the United Kingdom,185 60,000 Euros in Spain,186 70,000 Euros in 
Austria,187 and 120,000 Euros in Italy.188 Even the most rigorous among 
these requirements, the Italian one, which corresponds to about 
$164,000, is a trivial amount for public corporations.189 In other words, 
the question of why legal capital rules for public corporations have 
survived in Europe might have an easy answer: they simply do not 
matter. 
 
 180. See Richard A. Booth, Capital Requirements in United States Corporation Law, in Legal 
Capital in Europe 620 (Marcus Lutter ed., 2006). 
 181. E.g., Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case 
Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1165, 1202 (2001) (arguing that legal 
capital rules cannot be justified on efficiency grounds). 
 182. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC, of 13 Dec. 1976 on Coordination of Safeguards Which, 
for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, are Required by Member States of 
Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in Respect of the 
Formation of Public Limited Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, with a 
View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, 1977 O.J. (L 026) 1, as last amended by Directive 
2006/68/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 Sept. 2006, art. 6., 2006 O.J. (L 264) 
32–36. 
 183. Code de commerce [C. com] art. L225-96(3) (Fr.). 
 184. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, last amended 
by Gesetz [G], Dec. 22, 2011, BGBl. I. at 3044, § 179(2) (Ger.). Germany is a somewhat special case, 
though, in that it also makes it mandatory to increase the legal capital on certain occasions. Id. 
§ 150(2); Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB][Commercial Code], May 10, 1897, Reichgesetzblatt [RGBl.] 
219, last amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 4, 2013, BGBl. I at 1981, § 272 (Ger.).  
 185. Companies Act, 2006, c.46, § 283 (U.K.). 
 186. Las Sociedades de Capital art. 4(2) (B.O.E. 2010, 161) (Spain), available at 
http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Privado/rdleg1-2010.t1.html. 
 187. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Mar. 31, 1965, BGBl. 98/1965, last amended 
by Gesetz [G], Apr. 24, 2012, BGBl. I Nr. 35/2012, at 8, § 7 (Austria). 
 188. Codice civile [C. c.] art. 2327 (It.). 
 189. I am not the first to notice this. See, e.g., Armour et al, supra note 173, at 130 (noting that, 
with respect to the minimum capital requirement imposed by E.U. law, the relevant number “is 
actually quite small when compared to the actual capital needs of businesses organized as public 
firms”). 
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2. Employee Protection 
A more significant and therefore more interesting deviation from 
shareholder primacy lies in codetermination rules that give employees a 
voice in corporate governance.190 
In the United States, corporate law does relatively little to protect 
employees. Admittedly, many states have adopted so-called constituency 
statutes that permit the board to take into account the interest of 
stakeholders, including employees, when deciding which actions are in 
the corporation’s best interest.191 Delaware has not adopted such a 
provision, but the Delaware Supreme Court has embraced a similar 
position in its case law.192 However, it is not clear how much constituency 
statutes actually benefit employees. In practice, their main effect, and 
arguably their goal, is to make it easier for incumbent directors to defend 
against hostile takeovers. Thus, constituency statutes appear to be more 
about protecting directors than about protecting employees.193 
By contrast, many foreign countries—especially in Europe—give 
employees a direct voice in corporate governance. The most drastic 
example is the German codetermination regime,194 which allows 
employees to elect half the members of the supervisory board. However, 
Germany is by no means alone in giving employees access to corporate 
boards. Many other European countries including Austria, France, 
Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands have also 
adopted some type of codetermination regime.195 The decisive question, 
then, is whether protecting employees by giving them a voice in 
corporate governance is more efficient in Europe than it is in the United 
States. There are, in fact, at least two reasons to believe that this is the 
case.196 
 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 57–70. 
 191. See supra notes 52–65. 
 192. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that 
directors deciding whether to take defensive action against hostile takeovers might take into account 
“the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and 
perhaps even the community generally)”). 
 193. Cf. Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 
783, 793 (1994) (pointing out that such statutes make it much more difficult for shareholders to show 
that directors acted with the intention of protecting their own jobs). 
 194. See supra Part II. 
 195. See Horst-Udo Niedenhoff, Mitbestimmung im Europäischen Vergleich [A Comparison of 
European Codetermination Regimes], 32 IW-Trends Vierteljahresschrift zur Empirischen 
Wirtschaftsforschung 1, 5 tbl.3 (2005) (detailing the various European codetermination regimes); 
Andenas & Wooldridge, supra note 57, at 417–40 (describing codetermination regimes in Germany 
and the Netherlands). 
 196. A different explanation has recently been offered by Martin Gelter, supra note 172, at 134. 
According to Gelter, codetermination as well as other statutes protecting shareholders can be viewed 
as a response to concentrated stock ownership. Id. at 133. In a nutshell, his thesis can be summarized 
as follows: by and large, directors are more likely to treat employees fairly than shareholders. Id. 
at 152. Because concentrated ownership translates into less power for directors and more power for 
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3. Codetermination and Costs of Contracting 
One of these reasons relates to the function of codetermination as a 
disclosure mechanism. As Henry Hansmann has shown in his seminal 
work on corporate ownership, a central benefit of codetermination is 
that it can lower the corporation’s contracting costs by reducing 
informational asymmetries between firms and the labor unions with 
whom they negotiate.197 If labor unions lack credible information about 
their bargaining partners’ economic situation, then both sides might 
resort to costly measures such as strikes or lockouts.198 Codetermination 
helps to overcome this problem. Through the employee representatives 
on corporate boards, the unions have reliable information about the 
economic situation of firms, greatly reducing the likelihood of strikes and 
other distributive measures.199 
The disclosure function of codetermination is now widely 
recognized.200 Crucially, it has important implications for explaining 
transnational differences in codetermination laws. Obviously, the 
disclosure function can only acquire relevance where firms (or 
associations of firms) are confronted with labor unions, and where wages 
are in fact determined by collective bargaining agreements. It is in this 
 
shareholders, some other mechanism is needed to protect shareholders. Cf. id. at 155 (“[C]oncentrated 
ownership also exacerbates the holdup problem vis-a-vis nonshareholder constituencies.”). 
Codetermination and other statutes protecting employees fill this gap. Id. at 169. Despite Gelter’s 
careful and insightful analysis, I remain unconvinced. First, there is no persuasive evidence that 
European managers are more sympathetic to employees than to shareholders. That is particularly true 
in Germany, where large blockholders are often banks. Much of the power of these banks is derived 
from the fact that they are not limited to voting on their own shares, but also exercise voting rights for 
their customers. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169. Thus, if anything, the concern is that 
these large shareholders are not sufficiently profit-oriented. Second, the German codetermination 
regime seems ill-designed if its purpose is to counterbalance concentrated stock ownership. That is 
because stock ownership is usually most concentrated in smaller, privately held firms, and full-scale 
codetermination does not apply unless the corporation has two-thousand or more employees. Third, 
even if greater ownership concentration were to translate into a greater risk of expropriation for 
employees, the various statutes protecting employees in Germany and other European countries 
should not be interpreted as a response to that risk because they go far beyond what is necessary to 
counterbalance any risks posed by increased ownership. Notwithstanding greater ownership 
concentration, there is a broad consensus that workers in European countries such as Germany have a 
much lower risk of being terminated than their American counterparts. Hence, enacting these very 
wide-ranging protections as a response to concentrated stock ownership would have been a complete 
overkill. 
 197. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, 
and Economic Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1749, 1803 (1990). 
 198. Id. at 1766. 
 199. Id. 
 200. E.g., Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure; Minority Shareholders and Non-
Shareholder Constituencies, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 173, at 89, 110. The same 
considerations apply to the so-called works councils where the employees are represented at the firm 
level but outside the supervisory board. See Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An Economic 
Analysis of Works Councils, in Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation 
in Industrial Relations 27 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995). 
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context that a further difference between the United States and Europe 
gains importance. Compared to the United States, European countries rely 
much more strongly on collective bargaining agreements to set wages. 
As of 2011—the most recent year for which data is available—only 
about 13% of U.S. employees were covered by collective bargaining 
agreements.201 This number contrasts rather sharply with the corresponding 
percentages in European countries: 99% of employees are covered in 
Austria, 92% in France, 92% in Slovenia, 91% in Sweden, 89.5% in 
Finland, 62% in Germany, 40% in Slovakia, and 28.9% in Poland.202 
It follows that one of the central benefits of codetermination—
namely its potential to reduce bargaining costs between labor unions and 
employers—simply has much more relevance in many European 
countries, such as Germany, France, or Austria, than it does in the 
United States. This does not per se imply that codetermination is 
efficient in Europe; even there, its costs might outweigh its benefits. 
However, the crucial point is that codetermination is likely to be 
relatively more efficient in Europe than in the United States. 
4. Securing Employment Law Rules 
There is also another reason why codetermination might be more 
efficient in Europe than the United States. In practice, the employee 
representatives tend to use their role in the supervisory board to voice 
the concerns of employees and ensure, as they view it, that the latter are 
treated fairly.203 The additional protection thus accorded to employees 
might be the answer to an efficiency problem that arises due to the 
particular structure of European employment law. In the United States, 
employees can generally be fired at will.204 In most European countries, 
by contrast, the basic rule is that employees cannot be terminated 
without cause.205 One can question whether this type of strong 
 
 201. Jelle Visser, ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 Countries Between 1960 and 2012 (Amsterdams Instituut voor 
ArbeidsStudies (Amsterdam Inst. for Advanced Labour Studies), Database No. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.uva-aias.net/207. 
 202. Id. Note, however, that the reference years vary slightly. The data for Austria, Germany, 
Poland, and Sweden are for the year 2010; those for Finland, Slovakia, and Slovenia for 2009; those for 
France for 2008. 
 203. Cf. Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, 
in Employees and Corporate Governance 163, 189 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) 
(noting that, in practice, employee representatives specialize in employee matters, such as the 
workplace, social concerns, wages, and benefits). 
 204. E.g., Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment 
Opportunity in Conflict, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 73, 78–79 (2007). 
 205. Code du travail [C. trav.] art. L 1231-1 (Fr.) (requiring cause for the termination of 
employees if the employment contract was for unlimited duration); Kündigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG] 
[Protection Against Termination Act], Aug. 25, 1969, BGBl. I at 1317, last amended by Gesetz [G], 
Mar. 26, 2008, BGBl. I at 444, § 1 (Ger.) (prohibiting dismissals that are not justified by the 
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employment protection is efficient, but that is beside the point. As a 
practical matter, for most European countries, far-reaching steps toward 
the liberalization of employment markets are simply not politically 
feasible.206 
One major drawback of the for-cause requirement is that it creates 
an obvious incentive for harassment and, more generally, bad faith 
treatment. Seeking to rid themselves of below-average employees, 
employers have an incentive to make the relevant employees’ work 
environment unpleasant in order to persuade them to quit “voluntarily.” 
This is an issue of great practical importance. Empirical studies in various 
European countries suggest that workplace bullying is a widespread and 
serious problem affecting between two and twenty-two percent of 
employees, and that it has significant negative consequences for the 
health of employees.207 
Admittedly, one can make a theoretical case that workplace 
bullying and other bad faith treatment aimed at persuading employees to 
leave is not necessarily inefficient. After all, if one strongly believes in 
the efficiency of termination at will, then measures that weaken Europe’s 
for-cause requirements might seem prima facie desirable. However, in 
light of the significant negative impact that bullying has on the affected 
employees’ health—costs that are not usually reflected in the employer’s 
cost-benefit analysis—such a line of reasoning seems rather implausible. 
If, on the other hand, one assumes that bullying aimed at persuading 
workers to quit is inefficient, then one of codetermination’s benefits might 
be that it provides some protection against such bullying; employee 
representatives can use their clout in the supervisory board to persuade 
corporations to respect the rights of the employees. If one further assumes 
that American employers who can fire their employees at will do not 
need to rely on bullying to rid themselves of unwanted employees, the 
relevant protection might be more sorely needed in Europe than in the 
United States. 
In sum, the fact that some European countries protect employees 
through corporate governance, while the United States does not, can be 
 
employee’s behavior or person or compelling business reasons); Legge 15 luglio 1966, n. 604, in G.U. 
6 Aug. 1966, n. 195, art. 1 (It.) (requiring a justification for the termination of employees). See Jens 
Dammann, Place Aux Dames: The Ideological Divide Between U.S. and European Gender 
Discrimination Laws, 45 Cornell Int’l L.J. 25, 63 (2012) (noting that in most European countries, 
employees cannot be dismissed except for cause); see also Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Balancing 
Respective Rights in the Employment Contract: Contrasting the U.S. “Employment-at-Will” Rule with 
the Worker Statutory Protections Against Dismissal in European Community Countries, 4 J. Int’l L. & 
Practice 441, 478–93 (1995) (analyzing cause-requirements in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). 
 206. See infra Part V.4. 
 207. Cf. B. Meschkutat et al., Der Mobbing-Report: Eine Repräsentativstudie für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 9–12 (2002) (summarizing various studies on workplace bullying). 
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explained to a certain extent by efficiency considerations. 
Codetermination might simply be a response to Europe’s heavier reliance 
on collective bargaining agreements and less flexible termination rules. 
D. Doing More With Less 
Different court systems might also help explain why it is efficient for 
the United States to have fewer mandatory rules than many foreign (and 
in particular, many European) countries. Simply put, public corporations 
in the United States have access to better and more specialized courts, 
and as a result, might be “doing more with less.” One single norm in the 
United States—namely the duty of loyalty, which is generally thought to 
be mandatory208—might be enough to ensure a meaningful degree of 
minority protection because the United States can trust its courts to apply 
that duty more rigorously than it is applied in many other countries. 
To be clear, the point here is not that other countries fail to 
recognize fiduciary duties. In fact, fiduciary duties including the duty of 
loyalty are firmly established in European corporate law systems.209 Nor 
is the Delaware duty of loyalty more indeterminate and therefore more 
flexible than its European counterparts. Rather, as addressed elsewhere, 
the duty of loyalty in the legal systems of major European countries such 
as Germany and the United Kingdom is at least as indeterminate as it is 
in Delaware law.210 The decisive difference, then, does not lie in the 
existence of an indeterminate, or standard-based, duty of loyalty.211 
Rather, it lies in the extent to which jurisdictions are equipped with 
courts that have sufficient expertise to rigorously apply that duty. And it 
is in this respect that the United States dominates most and perhaps all 
other jurisdictions. 
In the United States, more than half of all public corporations are 
incorporated in Delaware;212 accordingly, they profit from Delaware’s 
 
 208. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law 
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 489, 496 n.16 (2002); Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of 
Loyalty into Contract, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 451, 474 n.173 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, Picking a Winner, 20 J. 
Corp. L. 451, 458 (1995) (reviewing Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 
(1993)); Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New Corporate Law, 
23 Cardozo L. Rev. 325, 340 (2001).  
 209. See, e.g., Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 56–100 (demonstrating that the law 
governing fiduciary duties is similarly indeterminate in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Following Kaplow’s distinction between rules and standards, it is now common to refer to 
indeterminate norms, whose content is determined only ex post, as standards. By contrast, rules are 
norms whose content is determined ex ante. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 557 (1992). 
 212. See generally Lewis S. Black, Jr., Del. Dep’t of State Div. of Corps., Why Corporations 
Choose Delaware (2007). 
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Chancery Court, which is widely thought to be unparalleled in terms of 
quality, experience, and speed.213 
In countless other countries—including many European ones—
court systems are less impressive. Often, the judicial infrastructure is 
simply lacking, and courts suffer from basic and obvious flaws such as 
extensive delays in the administration of justice, lack of expertise, and 
insufficient independence.214 Even in developed economies like France, 
Germany, or Spain, courts tend to share one common weakness—at the 
trial court level they tend to be far less specialized than the Delaware 
Chancery Court. To be sure, it is often asserted in the literature that civil 
law courts are more specialized than common law courts.215 This reflects 
the fact that civil law countries typically organize their court system to 
ensure a basic level of specialization. Typically, the judiciary is first 
divided into several distinct branches dealing with specific areas such as 
administrative law, civil and criminal law, tax law, and employment 
law.216 Then, within the civil and criminal law branch of the judiciary,217 
courts usually have a special chamber, or even a specialized court, that is 
dedicated to commercial law matters such as the Kammer für 
Handelssachen (chamber for commercial affairs) in Germany218 or the 
Tribunal de Commerce (commercial court) in France.219 
 
 213. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in 
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1995) (“Delaware’s Chancery Court is renowned 
for its contributions to the corporate area, in terms of both the quality of law it has created and its 
efficiency in resolving disputes.”); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679, 708 (2002) (“A principal attraction of incorporating in Delaware 
is the high quality of its chancery court.”); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the 
Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1205, 1212 (2001) (“Delaware’s chancery court is one 
of the most highly regarded courts in the country.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and American 
Corporate Regulation, 61 Bus. Law. 155, 167 (2005) (“[A]s even Delaware’s critics concede, the 
Delaware court system is remarkably efficient.”). 
 214. Cf. Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1, 7–10 (2008) (giving a detailed account of disparities in the quality of national judicial systems). 
 215. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities 
Market Failure, 25 J. Corp. L. 1, 29 (1999) (“The inflexibility of civil law courts has already led to the 
creation of specialized courts in some civil law countries, which specialized courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over some subject matters.”); Samuel L. Bufford, Bankruptcy Law in European Countries 
Emerging from Communism: The Special Legal and Economic Challenges, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 459, 476 
(1996) (“[C]ommon law courts tend to be general jurisdiction courts, while civil law court systems are 
frequently specialized, based on the particular code for which a given court is responsible.”). 
 216.  See, e.g., John Bell, Judiciaries Within Europe: A Comparative Review 45, 51 (2009) 
(noting that in France, criminal and civil cases are handled by the tribunaux d’instance, whereas 
commercial cases are litigated before tribunaux commerciaux and administrative cases are litigated 
before the tribunaux administratifs); id. at 110 (noting that the German judiciary is divided into 
ordinary courts, administrative courts, tax courts, labor courts, and social courts). 
 217. For historical reasons, civil and criminal law cases are typically handled by the same branch. 
 218. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] [Code on Court Constitution], May 9, 1975, BGBl. I 
at 1077, § 93 (Ger.) (authorizing state governments to form chambers for commercial affairs at the 
district court level). 
 219. Code de commerce [C. com.] art. L.721-1 (Fr.). 
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However, compared to what U.S. courts afford corporate litigants, 
this level of specialization is rather unimpressive. Even in U.S. states 
other than Delaware, there are often specialized commercial courts; in 
that respect, U.S. states do not lag behind their European counterparts.220 
Much more importantly, there is another reason why the Delaware 
Chancery Court—where much of the litigation involving the law of 
public corporations takes place—is far more specialized than European 
commercial courts. The Delaware Chancery Court hears corporate law 
cases from all over the United States, as well as some international ones, 
making it the nation’s primary forum for cases involving public 
corporations.221 
By contrast, civil law countries typically do not have one single 
predominant lower level court to hear most or all of the cases involving 
public corporations.222 Instead, such cases are spread throughout courts 
located all over the country. In Germany, for example, corporate law 
cases are typically tried—and often must be tried223—before the court 
where the corporation’s real seat is located.224 As a result, important 
corporate law cases are litigated in courts all over Germany. Although 
some court districts have the advantage of being home to more corporate 
headquarters—and thus trying more corporate law cases—than others, 
 
 220. See, e.g., Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of 
Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 Bus. L. 147, 152–202 (2004) (providing an overview of the 
commercial divisions that many U.S. state courts have set up). 
 221. Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke 
L.J. 879, 881 (referring to the Delaware Chancery Court as “the most prominent corporate law 
court”); Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate Law, 
17 Del. J. Corp. L. 683, 705 (1992) (noting the Delaware Chancery Court’s “prominence as a forum 
for the adjudication of corporate law issues”). For an empirical perspective, see Theodore Eisenberg 
& Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger 
Agreements, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1975, 1987 (2006) (examining a large sample of merger agreements and 
finding that the state of Delaware “leads as a litigation forum choice”). 
 222. The counter-examples are civil law countries that, like Luxembourg, are so small that they 
only have one or two trial courts dealing with commercial matters. However, due to the lack of a 
functioning charter market for public corporations in Europe, these courts also are not particularly 
specialized in corporate law. 
 223. For many types of cases, the district court where the corporation’s seat is located has exclusive 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, 
last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 22, 2011, BGBl. I. at 3044, § 98(1) (providing that the district court 
in the district where the corporation’s seat is located has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to 
the composition of the supervisory board); Id. § 132(1) (providing that the district court in the district 
where the corporation’s seat is located has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to shareholder 
information rights); Id. § 148(2) (providing that the district court in the district where the corporation’s 
seat is located will decide whether a derivative suit can be brought against the corporation); Id. 
§ 246(3) (providing that the district court in the district where the corporation’s seat is located has 
exclusive jurisdiction over complaints seeking to have a board resolution declared void). 
 224. Cf. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], Dec. 5, 2005, BGBl. I at 3202, 
last amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 10, 2013, BGBl. I at 3786, § 17(1) (Ger.) (providing that 
corporations can be sued in the district where the corporate seat is located and that a corporation’s 
seat is generally located where its administration is located). 
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this remains a far cry from Delaware, where a large portion of all major 
cases in the United States are heard.225 In other words, at the trial court 
level, the Chancery Court enjoys a tremendous advantage in terms of 
specialization over its civil law peers. 
Why does specialization matter? In the absence of a detailed set of 
mandatory corporate law norms, it is the general fiduciary duties—
particularly the duty of loyalty—that protect minority shareholders 
against controlling shareholders. However, fiduciary duties are 
notoriously vague in both European countries and the United States.226 
In other words, they are indeterminate standards rather than bright-line 
rules. Given that the law provides limited guidance, courts that lack 
experience with the law governing public corporations are ill positioned 
to apply existing fiduciary duty law aggressively. Therefore, the duty of 
loyalty in U.S. corporate law might end up offering substantially greater 
protection to minority shareholders than fiduciary duties in foreign 
corporate law systems. In other words, the United States might be able to 
constrain private ordering more strongly than the relatively low number 
of mandatory norms would suggest because it can rely on the peculiar 
specialization of the Delaware Chancery Court. Accordingly, differences 
in the quality of courts might be yet another reason why having fewer 
mandatory norms might be more efficient in the United States than 
elsewhere. 
IV.  The Costs of Mandatory Corporate Law 
For a comparative analysis seeking to justify varying degrees of the 
prevalence of mandatory law, it is not enough to focus on the benefits of 
such rules; one must also examine the costs. The costs of mandatory 
corporate law fall into two main categories which, although they overlap, 
are helpful to distinguish for analytical purposes. 
First, even if lawmakers choose the best possible mandatory rule, it 
is unlikely to be well suited for all companies. Thus, mandatory law 
always imposes a uniformity cost. Contractarians frequently point to this 
cost as an argument in favor of an enabling corporate law regime.227 
 
 225. John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 605, 653 
(2012) (“The Delaware Chancery Court has long functioned as a de facto ‘national’ court for U.S. 
corporate law.”). But see id. at 607 (“[T]here has been a large decline in the proportion of corporate 
lawsuits involving Delaware companies (by which we mean shareholder suits against the directors, 
officers, or controlling shareholders of these companies) filed in Delaware courts.”). 
 226. See Dammann, Indeterminacy, supra note 71, at 73–95 (demonstrating that the law governing 
fiduciary duties is similarly indeterminate in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
 227. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
1416, 1418 (1989) (“No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ structure of corporate 
law.”). 
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Second, it is not clear that lawmakers are very good at choosing the 
best possible mandatory rule.228 Aside from the general question of 
whether public officials are well-placed to furnish optimal corporate 
governance rules, there is the problem that mandatory law limits the 
potential for learning and experimentation: when all firms are subject to 
the same mandatory rule, it becomes difficult to find out what other rules 
might be more efficient.229 
These drawbacks to mandatory law exist in both the United States 
and Europe. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the relevant costs might 
not be uniform across countries. 
A. One Size Does Not Fit All 
Most notably, the problem that mandatory law imposes uniform 
rules on all types of firms will be more severe in countries where the 
landscape of firms is highly heterogeneous—or at least would be in the 
absence of mandatory corporate law. On the other hand, in countries 
where most firms have similar governance needs, uniform mandatory 
rules are less problematic. 
This observation is important to the issue at hand because on all 
conceivable measures, uniformity costs are likely to be particularly high 
in the United States: the size and diversity of the U.S. economy suggest 
that in most corporate governance matters there will be some firms that 
are not well-suited for the general rule. For example, it has been 
suggested that the rules that normally govern corporate boards need to 
be modified in venture-capital backed startups where directors arguably 
serve a different function than they do in regular corporations.230 None of 
this implies that other countries do not suffer from uniformity costs of 
this type, but the costs might be somewhat less severe. For example, in 
small countries with only a handful of public corporations, mandatory 
law might not matter much as long as lawmakers can be expected to 
closely tailor existing law to the needs of existing firms. 
B. The Quality of Mandatory Norms 
Concerns about the quality of mandatory norms are more difficult 
to evaluate. The question of whether mandatory norms are well designed 
 
 228. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
1784, 1787 (2006) (noting that public officials might err in identifying the optimal rules for public 
companies). 
 229. The importance of learning has also been advanced as an argument for regulatory competition. 
See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 23 Yale J. on Reg. 209, 211 (2006) (noting that the U.S. system of regulatory competition “has 
resulted in considerable experimentation and innovation in corporate law”). 
 230. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 967, 1020–24 (2006) (suggesting that fiduciary duties might need to be adjusted in start-ups). 
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depends in part on the quality of the political process, the aptitude of 
lawmakers, and other considerations. These considerations suggest that 
the costs of mandatory law are particularly high where the political 
process is corrupt, lawmakers are incompetent, etc. On that score, 
relatively well-governed countries like the United States would seem to 
be better positioned to make use of mandatory laws than many other 
jurisdictions, including some European ones. Of course, one can also 
make the argument that in truly corrupt countries, the content of the law 
does not matter much anyway, so the mandatory/enabling divide ends up 
being of little consequence. Meanwhile, among well-governed countries, 
it is difficult to tell whether some jurisdictions are inherently better at 
promulgating well-designed laws than others. The importance of this 
factor, therefore, must remain highly speculative. 
Foregoing experimentation should also be costly for all countries; 
however, as long as some countries are willing to allow room for 
experimentation, others can free ride. It is noteworthy in this context that 
many foreign countries are quite open to learning from U.S. corporate law. 
Over the past decade, the influence of U.S. corporate law and practice on 
corporate law systems around the world has been tremendous.231 These 
other countries forego experimentation themselves, but are still able to 
learn from the United States.232 Of course, the effectiveness of such free 
riding remains unclear. Insights gained in the United States might not be 
directly applicable to other countries, and what might be good for U.S. 
corporations might not work well elsewhere. 
On the cost-side, then, an account of why the United States relies 
less on mandatory corporate law than other countries remains vague and 
elusive. One can make a plausible conjecture that the uniformity costs 
imposed by mandatory law are probably higher in the United States than 
in some other countries; beyond this, one is left with little more than 
speculation. 
V.  The Future of American Exceptionalism 
Thus far, this Article has argued that differences in the prevalence 
of mandatory corporate law are by no means coincidental. Rather, they 
seem to be driven in no small part by efficiency considerations. Due to its 
peculiar institutional strengths and corporate ownership patterns, the 
United States stands to gain much less from mandatory corporate law 
than other countries. 
 
 231. For a detailed study on how U.S. corporate law has influenced German corporate law, see Jan 
von Hein, Die Rezeption US-amerikanischen Gesellschaftsrechts in Deutschland (2008). 
 232. Thus, ironically, the fact that U.S. law relies heavily on default rules might have made 
mandatory law in other countries less costly. 
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But are the underlying differences between the United States and 
foreign countries written in stone, or is the United States becoming more 
similar to the rest of the world and vice versa? This Part emphasizes that 
there is no easy answer to this question. 
A. Capital Markets 
Perhaps the most intriguing development pertains to capital 
markets. In recent years, much has been written about U.S. capital 
markets falling behind their foreign competitors.233 These concerns tend 
to focus on two issues. First, some voices bemoan that U.S. stock markets 
do not seem to be faring well in the international competition for new 
listings.234 Second, the costs of being listed in the United States are said to 
have increased substantially as a result of regulatory reforms, particularly 
the much-reviled Sarbanes-Oxley Act and more recently, the Dodd-
Frank Act.235 Neither concern is without foundation, but upon closer 
analysis, neither suggests that the U.S. advantage with respect to capital 
markets will fade anytime soon. 
1. Listings 
In recent years, concerns that the U.S. capital markets are losing too 
many listings or gaining too few new ones have been widespread. “U.S. 
Falls Behind in Stock Listings” reads a fairly typical headline from a 2011 
article in the Wall Street Journal.236 And a 2010 piece in the New York 
Times decries that “the number of companies listed on the nation’s major 
exchanges has plummeted”237 and contrasts the situation with that of 
“China or India where new listings are growing at a fast rate.”238  
However, as the U.S. economy has improved, so has the news on 
listings. In 2012, the most recent year for which data are available, 146 
new companies were listed on the NYSE. Taking into account delistings, 
this translated into a 1.3% increase in the total number of listed firms. 
Admittedly, the Shenzen Stock Exchange achieved a higher growth rate, 
experiencing a 9.1% increase in the number of listed firms. However, 
most foreign exchanges did much worse, and many of them even faced 
negative growth.  
 
 233. Aaron Lucchetti, U.S. Falls Behind in Stock Listings, Wall St. J. (May 26, 2011, 12:01 A.M.), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703421204576329400112880300 (“A combination 
of mergers, fewer U.S. IPOs, lower listing costs abroad and a shift in how investors and stockbrokers do 
their jobs has driven down the number of U.S. stock listings by a startling 43% since the peak in 1997—all 
during a period when the number of listings outside the U.S. has more than doubled.”). 
 234. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 235. See infra Part V.A.2. 
 236. Lucchetti, supra note 233. 
 237. Graham Bowley, Wall Street, the Home of the Vanishing IPO, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2010, at B1. 
 238. Id. 
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Figure 1: New Listings and Delistings in 2012239 
 
 Exchange Newly Listed Percentage Change,  
Number of Listed Firms 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 129 +9.1%
Deutsche Börse  25 +0.1%
London SE Group 115 -4.1%
NASDAQ 75 -3.8%
NYSE Euronext (U.S.) 146 +1.3%
Hong Kong Exchanges 64 +3.4%
Korea Exchange 33 -1.8%
Tokyo SE Group 69 +0.6%
NYSE Euronext (Europe) 27 -3.5%
 
In any case, looking at the number of new listings is not very helpful. 
First, they strongly reflect the current dynamic of the economy rather 
than long-term trends. Second, the mere number of listings does not 
reveal anything about the economic weight of the companies involved. 
A more useful measure of the size of capital markets focuses on 
market capitalization, defined as the product of the number of shares 
issued by listed companies and their respective share price. On that 
measure, it is true that some foreign exchanges are growing more rapidly 
than those in the United States, but U.S. markets are still far ahead. 
 
Figure 2: Stock Exchanges by Domestic Market Capitalization240 
 
	 1996 2001 2006 2011 2012 
NYSE 6,841,987.6 11,026,587 15,421,168 11,795,575.5 14,085,994.1 
NASDAQ 1,511,824.4 2,739,674.7 3,865,003.6 3,845,131.6 4,582,389.1 
London 1,642,582.4 2,164,716.2 3,794,310.3 3,266,418.1 3,396,504.9 
 
 239. World Fed’n of Stock Exchs., Monthly Report for December 2012 tbls. 1.2, 1.5, 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/monthly-reports (follow “Year 2012” and “Month 
December” to download complete report; then select “New Listings” for newly listed values; then 
select “Listed Companies” for percentage change). The number of new listings was calculated by 
adding the number of new companies listed through an IPO and the number of other newly listed 
companies. The data on the percentage change in the number of listed firms was taken from table 1.2, 
which compares the number of companies listed in December 2012 to the number of companies listed 
in December 2011.  
 240. See World Fed’n of Stock Exchs., Monthly Reports for December 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 
and 2012 tbl. 1.1, http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/monthly-reports (follow “Year” for the 
relevant year and “Month December”; then select “Market Cap” for table 1.1Domestic market 
capitalization). 
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Tokyo 3,011,161.4 2,264,527.9 4,614,068.8 3,325,387.8 3,478,831.5 
Frankfurt 664,913.2 1,071,748.7 1,637,609.8 1,184,500.2 1,486,314.8 
Hong	Kong 449,218.8 506,072.9 1,714,953.3 2,258,035.2 2,831,945.9 
Shanghai NA NA 917,507.5 2,357,423.3 2,547,203.8 
Euronext NA NA 3,708,150.1 2,446,767.5 2,832,188.5 
 
For example, the domestic market capitalization of the NYSE has 
grown from almost $7 trillion in 1996 to about $14 trillion in 2012—a 
growth of about 106% (see Figure 2). Other exchanges have achieved 
more impressive growth rates; Hong Kong, for example has grown by 
over 530%. However, these growth rates have been achieved from a 
relatively small basis, and it is doubtful whether they can be maintained. 
2. Excessive Regulation 
Governmental regulation is a second area of concern for those who 
see U.S. capital markets falling behind. Critics of U.S. regulation usually 
claim that recent steps toward more regulation have made U.S. listings 
unduly costly. In particular, it has been argued that Sarbanes-Oxley 
imposes costs on corporations that are not outweighed by corresponding 
benefits.241 
Whether U.S. exchanges are indeed overregulated, or whether 
existing regulation is too costly to justify its benefits, is a question that 
goes beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that tighter regulation can affect capital markets on several levels. 
First, tightened regulation drives up compliance costs. These costs 
might drive away some issuers; thus, tighter regulation might result in 
smaller markets. However, even if some foreign issuers are driven away 
by increased compliance costs or if some domestic firms are deterred 
from going public, other issuers might value tighter regulation because it 
allows them to send a stronger signal of quality by listing on U.S. 
exchanges. There is not yet sufficient evidence to tell which effect 
prevails in the long run. 
 
 241. See, e.g., Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States 
Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 187, 190 (2010) 
(“[A] result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which placed substantial new corporate 
governance requirements on entities wishing to issue stock in this country, the United States has 
experienced a significant drop in initial public offerings by foreign issuers.”) (footnote omitted); 
Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of Global 
Exchanges, 1 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 355, 356–57 (2007) (arguing that one of the primary reasons 
that the “NYSE has been losing listings is that foreign issuers are disenchanted with the U.S. stock market 
because of the costs of compliance with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”). 
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Second, tighter regulation might enhance investor confidence and 
thereby contribute to the liquidity of capital markets. In fact, there is 
some evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley has done just that.242  
Third, increased regulatory safeguards, while costly, can increase the 
quality and reliability of publicly available information, thereby 
increasing the efficiency of capital markets. And again, there is evidence 
that Sarbanes-Oxley has in fact led to higher quality information.243 
Thus, claims that tighter regulation endangers U.S. capital markets 
seem problematic. On the one hand, one can plausibly paint a scenario in 
which firms increasingly list on foreign exchanges to avoid what is 
considered excessive U.S. regulation. On the other hand, one can also 
conjecture that by opting for high-level regulation and enforcement, the 
United States will end up with the most efficient capital markets, 
regardless of size. On some measures, clearly, foreign countries are 
catching up, but whether they will challenge the U.S. lead is a different 
question. Given the empirical uncertainties involved, it seems too early 
to predict the decline of U.S. capital markets. 
B. Ownership Patterns 
Whether ownership patterns converge or diverge is equally difficult 
to predict. Different strands of the literature suggest different outcomes. 
On the one hand, part of the literature has argued that strong forces such 
as the rise of the shareholder class, regulatory competition, and 
ideological convergence are pushing countries toward the most efficient 
governance arrangements.244 This suggests that ownership patterns, too, 
will ultimately end up looking similar across the globe. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that ownership patterns should show substantial 
path dependence and thus resist convergence.245 The matter is further 
complicated by the fact that the direction of the causal link between the 
law on the one hand and ownership patterns on the other hand is not 
always clear. As noted above, the shape of ownership patterns might 
partially determine what legal rules countries adopt,246 but at the same 
 
 242. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 
29 Cardozo L. Rev. 703, 763 (2007) (“Considerable empirical academic evidence indicates that 
SOX 404 has improved the accuracy of financial reporting, improved liquidity and corporate 
governance, and helped disclose some frauds and discourage others.”). An entirely different question 
is whether higher liquidity leads to greater informational efficiency. See Paul C. Tetlock, Does 
Liquidity Affect Securities Market Efficiency? (Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~pt2238/papers/Tetlock_Liquidity_and_Efficiency_03_07.pdf (presenting 
indirect evidence that an increase in liquidity does not lead to an increase in informational efficiency). 
 243. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 242, at 763. 
 244. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 23. 
 245. See generally Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23. 
 246. The idea that ownership patters can determine the shape of legal rules is not new of course. 
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in 
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time, ownership patterns might be driven at least in part by the shape of 
legal rules.247 
It is only fitting, then, that the empirical evidence on the convergence 
in ownership patterns is also ambiguous. Studies undertaken in different 
years are poorly suited for comparing trends across time since they often 
differ in focus and methodology. On the European side, the most 
informative study was performed by Christoph Van der Elst concerning 
Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.248 The study 
tracks the development of ownership concentration for more than 1300 
companies between 1999 and 2007.249 Interestingly, this study yielded 
mixed results for different countries. Ownership became somewhat more 
dispersed in France, Italy, and Belgium, while becoming more 
concentrated in Spain and the United Kingdom.250 
In the United States, it is clear that ownership has changed over 
time, but the current direction is less obvious. Much of the older 
literature explains how the twentieth century saw the United States 
progress from concentrated to highly dispersed ownership.251 The more 
recent literature presents a snapshot of present time ownership 
structures and finds that block holdings are much more frequent than 
previously presumed.252 However, it remains unclear whether there is 
 
the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1 (2001) (providing examples of how, 
historically, changes in ownership patterns prompted changes in the law rather than vice versa). 
 247. This claim is most strongly associated with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
who have argued that differences in the level of legal protection accorded to minority shareholders can 
explain why dispersed ownership has arisen in some countries but not in others. Rafael La Porta et al., 
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance , 5 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 14–15 (2000). It should be noted, 
though, that even if one accepts the claims made by La Porta et al., it is quite difficult to argue that 
mandatory corporate law is the cause—rather than the result—of concentrated ownership. La Porta et 
al. have argued that the strength of protections for minority shareholders affects ownership patterns. 
Weak protections for minority shareholders encourage the emergence of controlling shareholders 
because controllers can expropriate minority shareholders. Id. at 13. Moreover, weak protections for 
minority shareholders are detrimental to the development of capital markets because investors are 
more willing to invest in public companies if the risk of expropriation is low. Id. at 15. Regardless of 
whether these claims are empirically correct, they are certainly internally coherent. By contrast, it is 
not at all clear why mandatory law should cause concentrated ownership. Mandatory law limits the 
power of controlling shareholders and thereby protects minority shareholders. Hence, to the extent 
that mandatory law affects ownership patterns, it should reduce rather than increase the concentration 
of ownership, and for the same reason, mandatory law should be beneficial to the development of 
capital markets. 
 248. Christoph Van der Elst, Shareholder Mobility in Five European Countries (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 104/2008, 2008). 
 249. Id. at 16. 
 250. Id. at 23. 
 251. See, e.g., Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding 
in America?, in A History of Corporate Governance Around the World 613, 613–51 (Randall K. 
Morck ed., 2005). 
 252. Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 Rev. Fin. 
Stud. 1377, 1379 (2009) (concluding that “most public corporations in the United States have large-
percentage shareholders”). But see Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 
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now an enduring trend toward greater ownership concentration. Thus, it 
remains difficult to predict whether in the foreseeable future, ownership 
patterns across the globe will converge. 
C. Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Reliance on collective bargaining agreements is another key factor 
in explaining differences in the prevalence of mandatory corporate law. 
As noted above, codetermination regimes might be more efficient in 
countries that rely more heavily on collective bargaining agreements to 
set employees’ wages than the United States. 
The most obvious way of assessing the importance of collective 
bargaining agreements is to focus on the fraction of employees covered 
by such agreements (bargaining coverage rates). As shown in Figure 3 
below, coverage rates in codetermination countries have remained fairly 
stable. The main exception is Germany, where coverage rates have 
declined from 85% in 1970 to 61% in 2010. In the Scandinavian countries, 
coverage rates have actually increased; in Finland, for example, coverage 
grew from 73% in 1970 to 98.5% in 2009. 
 
Figure 3: Bargaining Coverage Rates253 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007–10 
Austria 95 95 98 98.5 99 (2010) 
Czech	R. NA NA NA 41.1 47 (2010) 
France 70 77.4 94.5 92 (2001) 92 (2008) 
Germany 85 85 85 68.9 61 (2010) 
Hungary NA NA NA 42.5 (2001) 33.5 (2009) 
Luxemb. 60 60 60 60 58 (2008) 
Poland NA NA NA 42 (2001) 28.9 (2010) 
Slovakia NA NA NA 51 40 (2009) 
Slovenia NA NA 100 100 92 (2009) 
Denmark 80 82 84 83 (2001) 85 (2007) 
Sweden 84 85 86 (1989) 94 91 (2010) 
Finland 73 77 85 (1989) 86.5 89.5 (2009) 
Netherlands 76 81.1 78.9 84.7 84.3 (2010) 
 
However, coverage rates do not necessarily tell the whole story. 
Another interesting variable is the fraction of employees that are 
members of labor unions—a figure known as “union density.” In 
 
83 Bus. Hist. Rev. 443, 466 (2009) (“Other evidence . . . indicates, however, that blockholding is not as 
prevalent as Holderness’s findings imply.”). 
 253. Visser, supra note 201. 
J - Dammann_17(Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:34 PM 
494 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:441 
practice, a country’s union density can be much lower than its coverage 
rate because collective bargaining agreements are frequently applied to 
all of the firm’s employees, not just to those employees who are union 
members. Moreover, in some countries, such as France or Germany, the 
government can require that collective bargaining agreements be applied 
to all firms in a particular sector.254 The resulting difference is particularly 
striking in France, where in recent decades, only about ten percent of 
workers were members of labor unions, but more than ninety percent of 
workers received wages governed by collective bargaining agreements. 
Precisely because union density can be very different from coverage 
rates, the former is not particularly useful to assess the importance of 
collective bargaining arrangements. However, in the long run, declining 
union membership might also predict a declining role for collective 
bargaining agreements. It is instructive to consider, then, how union 
density has developed over time. As Figure 4 shows, union density has 
declined significantly in most of the codetermination countries, with the 
notable exception of the Scandinavian nations. 
 
Figure 4: Union Density255 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012 
Austria 62.8 56.7 46.9 36.6 28.4 27.8 (2011) 
Czech	
Republic 
NA NA NA 27.2 17.3 
(2009)
NA 
France 21.7 18.3 10 8.0 7.9 NA 
Germany 32 34.9 31.2 24.6 18.6 18 (2011) 
Hungary NA 94 
(1979)
83.1 21.7 16.8 
(2008)
NA 







Poland 90 65.7 
(1981)
36.5 17.2 14.1 NA 
Slovakia NA NA 67.3 
(1993)
32.3 16.9 16.7 (2011) 
Slovenia NA NA 69 41.6 26.3 24.4 (2011) 
Denmark 60.3 78.6 75.3 74.2 68.5 NA 
Sweden 67.7 78 81.5 80.1 68.9 NA 
Finland 51.3 69.4 72.5 75 70 69 (2011) 
Netherlands 36.5 34.8 24.3 22.6 19.3 19 (2011) 
 
 
 254. Dammann, supra note 205, at 61. 
 255. Visser, supra note 201. 
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As a result, it is quite difficult to predict whether collective bargaining 
agreements will retain their present importance. It is conceivable that as 
union membership declines further, coverage rates will eventually follow 
suit, and thereby undermine the relevant efficiency argument for 
codetermination. However, as the French example demonstrates, it is also 
possible that union coverage rates will remain largely decoupled from 
union density rates, allowing coverage rates to remain high despite falling 
union membership. 
D. Protections Against Dismissals 
The second feature of European employment policy that is relevant 
to codetermination concerns protections against dismissal. As noted 
above, most European countries only allow dismissal for cause.256 Over the 
last decade, some European countries have relaxed their employment 
protections, raising the question of whether Europe is slowly moving 
toward American-style flexibility. 
Contrary to the often simplistic depictions in the news,257 however, 
the actual picture is quite mixed. Over the last decade, those Member 
States that protect employees by giving them a voice on the supervisory 
board have adopted numerous changes to their law on protection against 
dismissals.258 While some of these changes have facilitated the dismissal of 
employees, others have had the opposite effect.259 More importantly, the 
relevant reforms have hardly touched the essence of the for-cause 
requirements. Rather, they have tended to constitute rather modest 
modifications around the edges. Reforms in France and Germany, the two 
largest codetermination states, might serve to illustrate this point. Both 
countries have clearly moved toward flexibility, but the scope of their 
reforms remains quite modest. 
France has been particularly active in reforming its employment law 
since the start of the new millennium. In 2005, it extended the duration 
of the probationary period in which management can terminate newly 
hired employees without cause. More specifically, the probationary 
period was extended from three months to three years.260 However, this 
 
 256. Id. at 63. 
 257. See, e.g., Mark Thompson, Europe Must Push On With Reform—Merkel, CNN Money 
(Jan. 24, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/24/news/economy/europe-economy-
merkel/index.html (“Germany introduced a radical overhaul of its labor market 10 years ago, 
increasing flexibility for employers and moderating wage growth.”). 
 258. Data based on Labor Market Reform Database (LABREF), European Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/economic_reforms/labref/result.cfm (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2014). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Loi 2005-846 du 26 juillet 2005 habilitant le Gouvernement à prendre, par ordonnance, des 
mesures d’urgence pour l’emploi [Law Authorizing the Government to Take Emergency Measures in 
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change concerned only firms with twenty or fewer employees261 and thus 
did not have any relevance for large publicly-traded firms. 
The following year, 2006, France adopted legislation designed to 
phase out the so-called Delalande contribution—essentially a tax that 
employers have to pay upon terminating an employee who is at least fifty 
years old.262 The relevant contribution had been designed to protect 
senior employees, but de facto created an incentive for employers to 
terminate older employees shortly before their fiftieth birthday. 
Also in 2006, France adopted legislation facilitating the conclusion 
of fixed-term employment contracts with employees who are at least 
fifty-seven years old.263 Fixed-term contracts benefit employers because 
they effectively allow employers to let their employees go at the end of 
the predetermined period without having to show cause for termination. 
Finally, a 2008 law extended probation periods for all workers and 
authorized the conclusion of fixed duration contracts between eighteen 
and thirty-six months for managerial employees.264 In other words, it is true 
that France took various steps toward a more flexible employment law. 
But the relevant reforms were hardly monumental and left the core of the 
for-cause requirement untouched. 
Germany presents a similar picture. As in France, various reforms 
sought to increase the flexibility of employment law but left the core of 
the for-cause requirement untouched. A statute adopted in 2002 allows 
fixed-duration contracts for a period of up to two years, and without the 
employer having to demonstrate a special justification for the fixed 
duration provided that the employee is at least fifty-two years old.265 
Previously, this had only been allowed for employees who were at least 
fifty-eight years old.266 In 2003, Germany changed its prohibition against 
 
the Area of Employment], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette 
of France], July 27, 2005, p. 12223. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Loi 2006-1770 du 30 décembre 2006 pour le développement de la participation et de 
l’actionnariat salarié et portant diverses dispositions d’ordre économique et social [Law for the 
Development of Participation and Employee Ownership and Miscellaneous Provisions Economic and 
Social], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
Dec. 31, 2006, p. 20210, art. 50. 
 263. Décret 2006-1070 du 28 août 2006 aménageant les dispositions relatives au contrat à durée 
déterminée afin de favoriser le retour à l’emploi des salariés ågés [Decree Adjusting the Provisions 
Relating to Fixed-term Contracts to Facilitate the Return to Employment of Older Workers], Journal 
Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 29, 2006, p. 12763. 
 264. Loi 2008-596 du 25 juin 2008 portant modernisation du marche du travail [Law on the 
Modernization of the Labor Market], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], June 26, 2008, p. 10224. 
 265. Erstes Gesetz für Moderne Diestleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt [First Act for Modern Services 
on the Labor Market], Dec. 23, 2002, BGBl. I at 4607, art. 7 (Ger.). 
 266. Id. 
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dismissals without cause to exempt firms with ten or fewer employees.267 
Prior to this reform, only firms with less than six employees had been 
exempt.268 The same statute introduced a provision allowing newly 
formed firms to hire employees on the basis of fixed-term contracts for 
up to four years and without special justification269—a departure from the 
general rule in German employment law that such contracts can only be 
concluded for two years and require a special justification.270 The relevant 
statute also simplified the law on mass layoffs by reducing the number of 
criteria that have to be considered in determining which employees have 
to be terminated first.271 
In light of the above, it can hardly be said that the codetermination 
countries are rushing toward American-style labor market flexibility. At 
most, one can conclude that some codetermination countries—such as 
France and Germany—are taking modest steps to soften the for-cause 
requirement around the edges; and some of these reforms do not even 
apply to the large public corporations subject to codetermination. Hence, 
to the extent that one sees codetermination as a mechanism that 
complements the for-cause termination rule, there is no reason to believe 
that this argument will fade anytime soon. 
E. Courts 
Differences in the quality of courts constitute another reason why 
mandatory law might be less efficient in the United States than in other 
countries. In most countries, this is an area where major changes cannot be 
expected within the foreseeable future. Reforming judicial systems is a 
notoriously daunting task, not least because judges often cannot be 
dismissed without putting judicial independence at risk.272 Moreover, 
among countries with well-functioning court systems, the main problem is 
a lack of specialization resulting from geographically decentralized 
decisionmaking. There is no reason to believe that European countries are 
in any way inclined to remedy this situation or that they even perceive it as 
a problem. 
Ironically, though, it is on the United States side that change might 
be afoot. A recent empirical study suggests that Delaware has been 
finding it more difficult to maintain its role as the primary forum for 
 
 267. Gesetz zur Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt [Law on Labor Market Reforms], Dec. 24, 2003, 
BGBl. I at 3002, art. 1 (Ger.). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. art. 2. 
 270. Teilzeit-und Befristungsgesetz [Part-time and Temporary Employment Law], Dec. 21, 2000, 
BGBl. I at 1966, § 14(2) (Ger.). 
 271. Gesetz zur Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt [Law on Labor Market Reforms], Dec. 24, 2003, 
BGBl. I at 3002, art. 1 (Ger.). 
 272. See, e.g., Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 214, at 3 (pointing out that reform is “both 
difficult and slow”). 
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public corporate law cases.273 If this trend persists, the long-term result 
might be a decline in judicial specialization. To be sure, there is an 
opposing complementary trend as well. Over the past decade, other 
states have been rushing to establish special commerce courts or 
commercial divisions.274 However, having many business courts, each of 
which hears some fraction of the United States’ major corporate law 
cases, still means a decline in specialization if the alternative is one court 
that hears all (or almost all) of the major cases. Thus, if the Chancery 
Court keeps losing litigants to courts in other states, the overall result is 
likely to be a decrease in judicial specialization. 
Conclusion 
American corporate law is different. At no time is this more 
apparent than with regard to the use of mandatory law. Whereas most 
other countries around the globe rely heavily on mandatory corporate 
law, U.S. corporate law is largely of an enabling nature. 
The traditional, if implicit, view seeks to explain this American 
exceptionalism by referencing the phenomenon of regulatory 
competition. According to this view, regulatory competition has forced 
U.S. states to disband their mandatory corporate law norms, whereas the 
absence of regulatory competition has allowed mandatory norms to 
persist elsewhere in the world. However, this narrative confuses cause 
and effect. Regulatory competition exists where it is allowed to exist, and 
the decisive question is why so many other countries have decided to 
protect their mandatory corporate law norms by suppressing regulatory 
competition while the United States has taken the opposite approach. 
This Article has shown that efficiency considerations might be key 
to understanding this mandatory law puzzle. The efficiency of enabling 
versus mandatory corporate law is not uniform across countries; it 
instead depends on numerous social and institutional factors. In 
particular, the efficiency of stock markets, ownership patterns, judicial 
infrastructure, and labor market flexibility play crucial roles. As a result, 
this Article argued that enabling corporate law might be substantially 
more efficient in the United States than it is in Europe and many other 
countries. In other words, the United States’ commitment to private 
ordering in corporate law might not be a simple political choice, but the 
reflection of various deep-seated institutional and social characteristics. 
None of this means that the gap between U.S. corporate law and the 
law used in most of the rest of the world is written in stone. Rather, with 
respect to some of the underlying factors—particularly the efficiency of 
capital markets—the gap between the United States and other countries 
 
 273. See supra note 221. 
 274. See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 220, at 152–202. 
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is shrinking. Some of the other differences, though, show little sign of 
fading. It follows, then, that when it comes to the mandatory/enabling 
divide, the end of American exceptionalism is not likely to come anytime 
soon. 
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